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INTRODUCTION

O

n July 12, 2016, an international arbitral tribunal issued a landmark ruling addressing a number of international law issues in the South China Sea. 1
More than four years have passed since that ruling, and the South China Sea
situation is unresolved. To phrase it less diplomatically: during this period,
China and the Philippines, the States involved, have made minimal progress
toward improving the situation, much less resolving it. Given these stagnant
conditions, it should be asked: would Chinese and Philippine compliance
with the ruling or adoption of the ruling, including its specific elements, by
non-party States make this situation better?
The South China Sea situation is a complex security problem, which involves several interwoven dynamics. These include not only international
law but also geopolitical power, economic competition, transnational security threats, food insecurity and frictional nationalism. International law
alone is not a solution, but a “rules-based approach” can help frame many
security challenges, manage the territorial and maritime disputes between the
claimant States and ultimately resolve those disputes. 2 The South China Sea
arbitration and the arbitral tribunal’s resulting award were a positive step in
applying a rules-based approach to framing, managing and resolving some
of the international disputes. To be sure, not every South China Sea legal
issue involves the international law of the sea, and not every dispute between
China and the Philippines was within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal
that issued the 2016 ruling. But if the two parties to the arbitration case fully
complied with the tribunal’s ruling and other non-party States voluntarily
accepted the tribunal’s findings and decisions, they could collectively eliminate some of the specific disputes between the States involved and improve
the overall situation. Thus, the international community should reflect upon
the value and viability of the arbitral tribunal’s ruling.
In assessing the arbitral tribunal ruling’s value and viability for a way
ahead in the South China Sea, there can be benefits to viewing the situation

1. South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, PCA Case Repository, Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2086.
2. Jonathan G. Odom, How a ‘Rules-Based Approach’ Could Improve the South China Sea
Situation, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: DIPLOMATIC, LEGAL AND SECURITY DIMENSIONS OF THE DISPUTE 115 (Murray Hiebert, Phuong Nguyen & Greg Poling
eds., 2014), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/
publication/140930_Hiebert_PerspectivesSouthChinaSea_Web.pdf.
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and the arbitral decision from the current perspectives of individual States.
This includes the States that were parties to the arbitration and those that
were not and States that are claimants in the South China Sea disputes and
ones that are not. The purpose of this article is to provide a more detailed
review and analysis of the perspective of one non-claimant State—the
United States—regarding the value and viability of the 2016 arbitration ruling.
This article will examine the U.S. perspective from several vantage
points. First, it will take a step back and approach the ruling through several
preliminary considerations. This will include providing an overview of the
South China Sea arbitration and the tribunal’s ruling and the timing of the
ruling in relation to the presidential transition from President Barack Obama
to President Donald Trump, which occurred around the time of the ruling.
Second, it will seek to extract an implied U.S. perspective about the tribunal’s
ruling by examining the Trump administration’s general approach to foreign
policy, its policy regarding China and U.S.-China relations, and its policy on
the South China Sea situation. Third, it will review the express U.S. perspective about the tribunal’s ruling, as derived from official U.S. statements and
actions during the four years since the tribunal issued its final award. Ultimately, this article will conclude that the United States has continuously invoked the tribunal’s ruling—and particular elements of that ruling—as reflecting international law that could improve the South China Sea situation;
however, it will also conclude that the United States faces several self-made
credibility challenges in invoking the ruling’s value and viability. In conclusion, this article will suggest several ways in which the United States could
strengthen its position in promoting the tribunal’s ruling as a positive way
ahead for improving the South China Sea situation.
II.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

Before attempting to identify and assess the current U.S. perspective on the
value and viability of the South China Sea arbitration ruling, one should consider several preliminary matters. These considerations include ensuring that
every reader has a solid foundation on the origins of the arbitration, the actual parties involved and their respective postures towards the proceedings,
the major legal issues considered in the arbitration and the significant elements of the tribunal’s decisions. They also include recognizing the political
environment in which the ruling was issued—specifically, the national political environments of individual States.
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A. Overview of the Arbitration and the Tribunal’s Ruling
In January 2013, the Philippines’ initiation of the South China Sea arbitration
against China raised a significant number of maritime law issues. 3 None of
the Philippines’ legal issues pertained to the competing territorial claims and
sovereignty disputes between the two States regarding specific islands in the
South China Sea. Instead, they focused on interpreting and applying provisions of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 4 a
multilateral treaty to which both the Philippines and China are parties. 5
From the initiation of the arbitration case and throughout the remainder
of the proceedings, China refused to participate and questioned the tribunal’s
jurisdiction. Such jurisdictional determinations under UNCLOS, however,
do not reside with the parties: “In the event of a dispute as to whether a
court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by decision of
that court or tribunal.” 6 The tribunal was constituted in accordance with
UNCLOS 7 and composed of five experts in the field of international law of
the sea—four of whom had a combined fifty-four years of judicial experience serving as members of the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea. 8
In October 2015, the arbitral tribunal issued a 159-page Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, which analyzed procedural issues and determined
3. Albert del Rosario, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, Statement on the UNCLOS Arbitral Proceedings against China (Jan. 22, 2013), https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2013/01/22/statement-the-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-on-the-unclos-arbitral-proceedings-against-china-january-22-2013/.
4. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
5. The Philippines became a party to UNCLOS on May 8, 1984, China became a party
on June 7, 1996. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en (last visited Jan. 6, 2021).
6. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 288(4).
7. Id. pt. XV, § 2, annex VII.
8. The five members of the arbitral tribunal in this case were Judge Thomas A. Mensah
(president), Judge Jean-Pierre Cot, Judge Stanislaw Pawlak, Professor Alfred H. Soons, and
Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum. Four had either previously served or were currently serving as
elected members of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for the number of
years indicated as of the tribunals award: Judge Mensah, nine years; Judge Cot, fourteen
years; Judge Wolfrum, twenty years; and Judge Pawlak, eleven years.
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that the tribunal had jurisdiction over these matters as a matter of law. 9 After
deciding it had jurisdiction, the tribunal devoted the next nine months to
receiving pleadings and evidence presented by the Philippines, deriving likely
arguments by China from public statements and documents issued by
China’s government, and convening a series of hearings for the parties to
make oral arguments and answer the tribunal’s questions. 10
Nine months later, the arbitral tribunal issued a 501-page final award,
which comprehensively considered, analyzed and decided a number of substantive legal issues and made many valuable findings of fact. 11 In total, the
Philippines submitted fifteen discrete legal issues to the tribunal. 12 After analyzing each, the tribunal rendered sixty-five specific findings and declarations. 13 Many of these findings and decisions focused upon ways in which
China had violated the Philippines’ maritime rights under UNCLOS and had
engaged in various activities that breached China’s obligations as a party to
UNCLOS. Of note, the tribunal’s ruling analyzed and invalidated China’s
infamous “nine-dash line” claim, which encompasses more than 85 percent
of the South China Sea. 14
In its final award, the tribunal interpreted and analyzed numerous key
provisions of UNCLOS and reached several legal conclusions. First, submerged features in the South China Sea are not entitled to any maritime entitlements (e.g., a territorial sea). 15 Second, low-tide elevations cannot be appropriated as land, 16 are not entitled to territorial seas of their own, 17 and can
increase the breadth of the territorial sea of a nearby high-tide elevation only
if they are located within the territorial sea of that high-tide elevation. 18
Third, a State cannot enhance through “human modification” the legal status
9. South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, PCA Case Repository, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015),
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2579.
10. Copies of the Philippines’ written pleadings and supporting evidence are catalogued
on the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s website. See The South Sea Arbitration, PCA,
https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/ (follow Documents hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 6, 2021).
11. South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 1.
12. Id. ¶ 112.
13. Id. ¶ 203.
14. Id. ¶¶ 169–278.
15. Id. ¶¶ 309, 693–94.
16. Id. ¶ 309.
17. Id. ¶ 308.
18. Id. ¶¶ 309, 693–94.
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or entitlements of a geographic feature beyond what that feature is naturally
entitled. 19 Fourth, a non-archipelagic State may neither draw straight baselines around a South China Sea island group nor claim special status to the
waters within the group. 20
Applying these legal conclusions, the tribunal also undertook an exhaustive review of objective evidence about the natural attributes of eleven specific geographic features, which the Philippines had identified in its arbitration pleadings. This objective evidence included satellite imagery and archived nautical charts and sailing directions published by multiple navies that
had sailed through the South China Sea for many years (i.e., those of China,
France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States). 21 These archived
charts and directions predated the South China Sea disputes and the filing
of the arbitration case, so their veracity could be trusted. More specifically,
they were intended to inform mariners of the accurate status of geographic
features rather than serve as manufactured evidence to skew the legal status
of those features for some future litigation. From this review of objective
evidence about these eleven South China Sea features, the tribunal determined that six were “high-tide features” 22 and the other five were “low-tide
elevations.” 23
With regards to the six high-tide features, the arbitral tribunal interpreted
and applied Article 121 of UNCLOS in determining their legal status. 24 The
tribunal explained that each is either (a) a “rock” that is legally entitled to
only a territorial sea or (b) a “fully entitled island” entitled to both a territorial
sea and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 25 Thereafter, the tribunal further
evaluated whether each of those six features is entitled to an EEZ, devoting
approximately eighty-five of the award’s 501 pages to that question. 26 In interpreting and applying Article 121(3), the arbitral tribunal focused on
19. Id. ¶¶ 305, 508.
20. Id. ¶¶ 571–76.
21. This evidence reviewed by the arbitral tribunal included nautical charts and sailing
directions from the British Royal Navy, the Imperial Japanese Navy, the French Navy, the
U.S. Navy, and the Chinese Navy. Id. ¶¶ 327–81.
22. The high-tide elevations included Scarborough Shoal, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross
Reef, Johnson Reef, McKennan Reef, and Gaven Reef (North). Id. ¶ 382.
23. The low-tide elevations included Hughes Reef, Gaven Reef (South), Subi Reef,
Mischief Reef, and Second Thomas Shoal. Id. ¶ 383.
24. Id. ¶¶ 554–570.
25. Id. ¶ 280.
26. Id. ¶¶ 385–648.
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whether a particular high-tide elevation was capable of sustaining human life.
The tribunal stated, “the fact that a feature is not currently inhabited does
not prove that it is uninhabitable.” 27 But the tribunal immediately after that
stated, “Nevertheless, historical evidence of human habitation and economic
life in the past may be relevant for establishing a feature’s capacity.” 28 After
examining the ordinary meaning of Article 121 in the context of its object
and purpose, the tribunal concluded that the “capacity” of a particular island
to sustain human habitation or an economic life of its own “must be assessed
on a case-by-case basis.” 29 The tribunal recognized that some geographic
features are clearly capable—or clearly incapable—of sustaining human habitation, while for other features the capability is less clear, the tribunal opining that “the most reliable evidence of the capacity of a feature will usually
be the historical use to which it has been put.” 30 It also noted that “a purely
official or military population, serviced from the outside, does not constitute
evidence that a feature is capable of sustaining human habitation.” 31 Applying Article 121 to these six high-tide features, the arbitral tribunal determined
that none of them was “capable of sustaining human habitation or economic
life of their own” and, therefore, did not “generate entitlements to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.” 32
The tribunal’s legal and factual analysis could provide several valuable
functions for the claimant States to frame, manage and ultimately resolve the
South China Sea disputes. First, given that China’s nine-dash line is one of
27. Id. ¶ 483.
28. Id. ¶¶ 484, 489
The use in Article 121(3) of the term `habitation’ includes a qualitative element that is reflected particularly in the notions of settlement and residence that are inherent in that term.
The mere presence of a small number of persons on a feature does not constitute permanent or habitual residence there and does not equate to habitation. Rather, the term habitation implies a non-transient presence of persons who have chosen to stay and reside on the
feature in a settled manner. Human habitation would thus require all of the elements necessary to keep people alive on the feature, but would also require conditions sufficiently
conducive to human life and livelihood for people to inhabit, rather than merely survive on,
the feature.

29. Id. ¶ 546.
30. Id. ¶ 549.
31. Id. ¶ 550.
32. Id. ¶ 1203(b)(7).
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the largest obstacles to the claimant-States finding a zone of possible agreement 33 among their respective bargaining positions and making progress in
resolving the disputes, the potential value of the tribunal invalidating this
unprecedented and unequaled claim cannot be overstated. Second, each of
the tribunal’s legal conclusions about which geographic features have maritime entitlements and which do not could, if applied universally among all
the South China Sea claimants, significantly reduce the actual geographic areas of dispute. Third, the tribunal’s review of specific features with objective
evidence provides a useful methodology for claimant States in their international negotiations or other tribunals in future cases to effectively assess the
legal and factual status of specific South China Sea features. In short, not
only were the tribunal’s legal determinations rooted in a thorough application of UNCLOS, but they have a practical value in offering a possible way
ahead for addressing several of the unresolved issues in the South China Sea.
Immediately after the arbitral tribunal issued its final award, however,
China announced it would ignore the ruling. 34 Speaking about the ruling, one
of China’s senior diplomats publicly declared: “It is just a piece of waste
paper. You may just chuck it in the bin, leave it on the shelf, or put it in
archives.” 35 But, as expressly provided in UNCLOS, “[a]ny decision rendered by a court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall be
final and shall be complied with all the parties to the dispute.” 36 Therefore,
as a matter of international law, both the Philippines and China are legally
obligated to comply with the tribunal’s ruling; otherwise, they are in violation
of their treaty obligations under UNCLOS.
B. Capturing a National Perspective in a Presidential Transition
When assessing the viability of the tribunal’s ruling, at least one political reality must be acknowledged at the outset. More specifically, the ruling’s viability has been impacted by an extraneous but nonetheless important factor:
33. ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES (2011).
34. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, Statement on the Award
of 12 July 2016 of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration Established at
the Request of the Republic of the Philippines (July 12, 2016),
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1379492.htm.
35. Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin, People’s Republic of China, Press Conference
(July 13, 2013), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/wjbxw_1/t1381980.htm [hereinafter Zhenmin Press Conference].
36. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 296(1).

129

International Law Studies

2021

its timing. 2016, the year in which the tribunal issued its final ruling, was also
an election year for several States’ national political leadership. Most notably,
it was a presidential election year for the Philippines. 37 Similarly, it was also
a watershed election year in the United States, in which a president of one
major political party was succeeded by a president of the other major political party. But unlike the Philippines, where the new president had assumed
office before the arbitration ruling was issued, resulting in a unitary view of
the actual ruling, the official U.S. “perspective” of the arbitration ruling was
viewed twice: initially by President Obama and his outgoing administration
and subsequently by President Trump and his incoming administration.
When the tribunal issued its final award in July 2016, President Obama
and his administration still had seven remaining months of his second fouryear term. During a media interview three months before the tribunal issuing
37. In the Philippines, political power transitioned from Benigno Aquino III, a president who had been described as the “chief architect” of the arbitration. Nikko Dizon,
Aquino on Arbitral Court Ruling: ‘A Victory for All,’ INQUIRER.NET (July 13, 2016),
https://globalnation.inquirer.net/141043/aquino-on-arbitral-court-ruling-a-victory-for-all.
President Aquino was succeeded by Rodrigo Duterte from a rival political party. About the
arbitration case, Duterte had announced during the presidential election campaign, “I have
a similar position as China’s. I don’t believe in solving the conflict through an international
tribunal.” Emily Rauhala, Rise of Philippines’ Duterte Stirs Uncertainty in the South China Sea,
WASHINGTON POST (May 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/rise-ofphilippines-duterte-stirs-up-uncertainty-in-the-south-china-sea/2016/05/10/d75102e21621-11e6-971a-dadf9ab18869_story.html. The new Philippines’ president was inaugurated
in June 2016, the tribunal issued its ruling only two weeks later. Duterte raised questions
about his commitment to upholding the ruling, publicly stating, “In the play of politics now,
I will set aside the arbitration ruling.” Leila B. Salaverria, Duterte to Set Aside UN Tribunal
Ruling on Maritime Dispute, INQUIRER.NET (Dec. 18, 2016), https://globalnation.inquirer.net/150837/duterte-set-aside-un-tribunal-ruling-maritime-dispute. But after these
comments drew both international and domestic criticism, his foreign affairs secretary
quickly clarified that the Philippines government “reaffirms its respect for and firm adherence to this milestone ruling and will be guided by its parameters when tackling the issue of
maritime claims in the South China Sea” and the new president “will not deviate from the
four corners of the ruling.” Yuji Vincent Gonzales, Yasay: Duterte Won’t Deviate from South
China Sea Ruling, INQUIRER.NET (Dec. 19, 2016), https://globalnation.inquirer.net/150895/yasay-duterte-wont-deviate-south-china-sea-ruling. The following four
years of the Duterte administration have seen a hot-cold relationship with Beijing, with
some observers continuing to question the extent to which the Philippines is committed to
the tribunal’s ruling. Renato Cruz De Castro, After Four Years, the Philippines Acknowledges the
2016 Arbitral Tribunal Award!, ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (Jul. 22, 2020),
https://amti.csis.org/after-four-years-the-philippines-acknowledges-the-2016-arbitral-tribunal-award/.
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its final award, Obama personally forecast his hope for how the arbitration
could provide a way ahead for the South China Sea situation:
What we are trying to uphold is a basic notion of international rules, norms
and order. And, so, for example, if the Filipinos appeal to international tribunals under the treaty of [the] law of the sea, which China and the Philippines are both signatories too, that's a way to resolve a dispute, not by sending out a gunship or threatening fishermen. 38

Clearly, he was aware of and mindful of the eventual ruling by the tribunal
and its significance.
On the day of the ruling’s issuance, the Obama administration made
three official statements about the ruling. First, State Department spokesperson John Kirby issued a statement that emphasized the United States
“strongly supports the rule of law” and “supports efforts to resolve territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea peacefully, including
through arbitration.” 39 It also highlighted that the arbitral tribunal’s decision
was “final and legally binding on both China and the Philippines” and expressed “hope and expectation that both parties will comply with their obligations.” 40 About the substantive elements of the tribunal’s ruling, this initial
statement withheld judgment: “We are still studying the decision and have
no comment on the merits of the case, but some important principles have
been clear from the beginning of this case and are worth restating.” 41
Second, Daniel Kritenbrink, who was serving as President Obama’s senior advisor on Asia policy, also addressed the tribunal’s ruling in public remarks on the day of its issuance. Coincidentally, Mr. Kritenbrink happened
to be speaking at an annual conference hosted by a Washington-based think
tank focused on the South China Sea. At the outset of this speech, he refer38. Interview by Charlie Rose with President Barack Obama, in Hanover, Germany
(Apr. 26, 2016), THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-with-charlie-rose-hanover-germany.
39. John Kirby, Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, Press Statement on Philippines-China Arbitration (July 12, 2016), https://kr.usembassy.gov/p_gov_071216/.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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enced the State Department’s press statement, describing it as “represent[ing] the United States’ position on the arbitral ruling.” 42 Then, he recited
the full statement to the conference audience. In concluding his remarks
about the ruling, Mr. Kritenbrink acknowledged, “We will need to study the
precise implications of today’s ruling.” 43 He devoted the remainder of his
conference speech to U.S. policy on the South China Sea and the greater
Asia-Pacific region.
Third, an unidentified “Senior State Department Official” provided a
“background brief” about the arbitral tribunal’s ruling to the news media via
teleconference. In this official’s opening comment, he or she highlighted the
following four “key elements” of the ruling:
[F]irst, the invalidation of the nine-dash line claim; secondly, the determination that the features in the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Reef are
entitled to no more than 12 nautical miles by way of maritime space; that
the construction of artificial islands by China and the conduct of Chinese
fishing fleets violated the rights of the Philippines; and that the large-scale
reclamation and constructing these military outposts in the Spratlys damage the environment. 44

But the official also acknowledged that the tribunal’s ruling was “immensely
complex.” 45 Therefore, he or she stated, “[E]veryone—all the parties and
certainly the United States—need time to digest it and make an assessment
of the implications of the ruling.” 46 Lastly, the official forecast that the ruling
“does create an important diplomatic opportunity” and “opens the door to
some very practical and potentially productive discussions among the various claimants in the South China Sea.” 47 For the remainder of this background briefing, the official answered questions posed by the news media.
Of note, this background briefer discussed the elements of the ruling
that found none of the geographic features analyzed by the tribunal to be
42. Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Senior Director for Asian Affairs, National Security Council,
Remarks at the Sixth Annual Center for Strategic & International Studies South China Sea
Conference (July 12, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HIWEzu10tZA.
43. Id.
44. Senior State Department Official, Background Briefing on South China Sea Arbitration (July 12, 2016), https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/07/259976.htm.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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islands entitled to a 200 nautical mile EEZ. The briefer stated, “But there
are plenty of other features outside of the Spratlys which do generate an
EEZ.” 48 Similarly, the briefer later stated, “But there are islands in the South
China Sea—just not in the Spratlys—that are presumed to be islands and
presumed therefore to generate 200 nautical—or at least generate an
EEZ.” 49 Such statements were not contrary to the actual ruling; however,
they did appear to acknowledge the ruling's limited scope—namely, that the
tribunal did not address the legal status of every geographic feature located
in the South China Sea.
After the Obama administration made these immediate statements on
the day of the tribunal’s ruling, there is a limited public record of the extent
to which President Obama and senior officials within his administration referenced the ruling in speeches and diplomatic talks during the remaining
seven months he was in office. A database search of public statements by
President Obama reveals that he appears to have publicly made only one
subsequent comment about the ruling. In September 2016, he invoked it
when addressing the leaders of the ASEAN States:
With respect to maritime issues, we’ll continue to work to ensure that disputes are resolved peacefully, including in the South China Sea. The landmark arbitration ruling in July, which is binding, helped clarify maritime
rights in the region. I recognize this raises tensions, but I also look forward
to discussing how we can constructively move forward together to lower
tensions and promote diplomacy and regional stability. 50

On at least one occasion, the Obama administration invoked the ruling.
Less than one month before President Obama left office, the State Department delivered a diplomatic note to China concerning its maritime claims in
the South China Sea. This note referred to “three papers [circulated by
China] regarding its claims in the South China Sea” following the tribunal’s
ruling on July 12. 51 The note then responded to substantive elements of
those three Chinese documents. Many of these points were consistent with
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. President Barack Obama, Remarks at the U.S.-ASEAN Meeting, Vientiane, Laos,
(Sept. 8, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/08/remarks-president-obama-us-asean-meeting.
51. Diplomatic Note to China, 2016 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 12, §A(2)(b), at 520–21, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2016-Digest-United-States.pdf.
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decisions reflected in the tribunal’s ruling. But at no point did the diplomatic
note expressly refer to the South China Sea arbitration or the tribunal’s ruling. Beyond the September 2016 remarks by President Obama and the December 2016 diplomatic note, the public record is unclear whether the
Obama administration invoked the tribunal ruling in meetings with government officials of China, the Philippines or any other States. But if the quiet
public record mirrors a quiet private record, it could have reflected a deliberate and calculated decision to create strategic decision space for the claimant-States to assess the ruling on their own and a hope that those States
would choose to implement elements of the ruling.
Seven months after the tribunal issued its ruling, President Obama transitioned power to his successor in January 2017. Thus, President Trump governed only in a geopolitical world where the arbitration ruling already existed.
Hence, it could be somewhat difficult to assess the extent to which the arbitration ruling influenced Trump administration policy. It might be that the
ruling was baked into the metaphorical cake of the administration’s foreign
policy, including, but not limited, to its South China Sea policy. As President
Trump’s four-year term in office has now concluded, there is ample public
record of the administration’s foreign policy, including its strategic documents, official statements, and executive actions to identify and assess the
U.S. perspective on the value and viability of the tribunal’s ruling.
III.

THE IMPLIED U.S. PERSPECTIVE ON THE TRIBUNAL’S RULING

Further complicating any effort to assess the tribunal ruling’s influence on
the United States is the unavailability or nonexistence of presidential-level
statements about the ruling during the Trump administration. As mentioned
above, President Obama had expressly addressed the importance of the
South China Sea arbitration on at least two occasions. In contrast, President
Trump made no known public reference to the arbitration ruling. This includes no mention of the arbitration or the tribunal’s ruling in either his official statements 52 or tweets. 53 But if the aphorism “absence of evidence is
52. A search of President Trump’s speeches, statements and documents conducted
online of The American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/, produced
negative results (last search conducted on Jan. 6, 2021).
53. A search of President Trump’s tweets conducted online of Trump Twitter Archive,
http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com/archive, produced negative results (last search conducted on Jan. 6, 2021).
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not evidence of absence” 54 is true, then what might be informational sources
from which one could glean the U.S. perspective on the arbitration ruling
under the Trump administration?
As a practical matter, one should consider several lenses. They include
the Trump administration’s general approach to foreign policy, its strategic
view of China, its desired end-state in the South China Sea, its public statements specifically about the ruling and its operational actions to effectuate
U.S. policy and the ruling. Each of those lenses is examined below.
A. U.S. Approach to Foreign Policy
First, consider President Trump’s general philosophy and approach to U.S.
foreign policy. Relative to prior presidential administrations, including the
Obama administration, President Trump and his administration were more
skeptical of the United States joining multilateral treaties and subjecting itself
to third-party mechanisms for resolving international disputes. There is
plenty of evidence to demonstrate this skepticism.
In particular, President Trump moved away from several significant multilateral agreements, which had been visible hallmarks of his predecessor’s
approach to international relations. For example, three days after being inaugurated, President Trump issued a memorandum directing the United
States to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement negotiations. 55 President Trump later stated during his first official visit to the AsiaPacific region, “What we will no longer do is enter into large agreements that
tie our hands, surrender our sovereignty and make meaningful enforcement
practically impossible.” 56 Instead of entering multilateral trade agreements,
the Trump administration emphasized that the United States would focus
54. Made popular by astronomer Carl Sagan, this aphorism is subject to debate as to its
actual originator. See Absence of Evidence Is Not Evidence of Absence, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR,
https://quoteinvestigator.com/2019/09/17/absence/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2021).
55. Memorandum from President Donald J. Trump to the United States Trade Representative Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the Tran-Pacific Negotiations
and Agreement (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-regarding-withdrawal-united-states-trans-pacific-partnership-negotiations-agreement/.
56. President Donald Trump, Remarks at APEC CEO Summit, Da Nang, Vietnam,
(Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presidenttrump-apec-ceo-summit-da-nang-vietnam/ [hereinafter APEC CEO Summit Remarks].
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on negotiating and concluding “bilateral” ones. 57 Five months into his presidency, President Trump also announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris
Climate Accord. He described this agreement as “the latest example of
Washington entering into an agreement that disadvantages the United States
to the exclusive benefit of other countries.” 58
Five days after President Trump’s inauguration, the text of a draft executive order for the new administration entitled, “Moratorium on New Multilateral Treaties” 59 was made public. It expressed concern that “there has
been a proliferation of multilateral treaties that purport to regulate activities
that are domestic in nature.” 60 To address this concern, this order would
have created a “high-level” treaty review committee, composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the President’s National Security
Advisor, the Counsel to the President and several other high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch. This committee’s ordered duties and functions
would be to assess “any new treaties – other than treaties that are clearly
appropriate matters of international concern.” 61 The order would have also
imposed a “moratorium on new treaties (other than those involving natural
security, extradition and international trade), except on the Treaty Review
Committee’s review and recommendation.” This committee would also have
been tasked to “[r]eview all multilateral treaties that have been negotiated
and are awaiting the President’s signature and recommend to the President
whether he should sign any such treaty.” 62 While there is no subsequent public record to indicate President Trump ever issued this executive order, 63 the
57. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (2017), https://www.white
house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf; see also APEC
CEO Summit Remarks, supra note 56 (“I will make bilateral trade agreements with any IndoPacific nation that wants to be our partner and that will abide by the principles of fair and
reciprocal trade.”).
58. President Donald Trump, Statement on the Paris Climate Accord (June 1, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/.
59. Explanatory Statement: Moratorium on New Treaties, https://perma.cc/8NKK-T6L5
(last visited on Jan. 6, 2021).
60. Id. at 1
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2.
63. A search of all executive orders issued by President Trump, conducted online of
databases maintained by the National Archives, https://www.federalregister.gov/presidential-documents/executive-orders, produced negative results (last search conducted on Jan.
6, 2021).
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fact it was proposed demonstrates the Trump administration’s philosophical
skepticism of multilateral treaties.
Additionally, President Trump and his administration were concerned
about other countries using international courts in their disputes with the
United States and skeptical of those courts handling of the disputes. For
example, in October 2018, the Trump administration announced that the
United States was terminating the 1955 Treaty of Amity with Iran. 64 At the
time, Secretary of State Pompeo stated that the decision to terminate the
treaty was in response to Iran bringing “a meritless case in the International
Court of Justice alleging violations of the Treaty of Amity.” 65 Secretary Pompeo further stated that Iran was “attempting to interfere with the sovereign
rights of the United States to take lawful actions necessary to protect our
national security.” 66 Lastly, he characterized Iran as “abusing the ICJ [International Court of Justice] for political and propaganda purposes and their
case, as you can see from the decision, lacked merit.” 67
On that same day in October 2018, the Trump administration announced that the United States was withdrawing from the Optional Protocol
and Dispute Resolution to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 68 Serving as President Trump’s National Security Advisor at the time,
Ambassador John Bolton announced the decision to withdraw was in response to Palestine bringing a case against the United States in the International Court of Justice for its decision to move the U.S. Embassy from Tel
Aviv to Jerusalem. 69 Speaking about the decisions to terminate the Iran treaty
and withdraw from the Optional Protocol, Ambassador Bolton stated, “we
will commence a review of all international agreements that may still expose
the United States to purported binding jurisdiction dispute resolution in the
64. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Iran-U.S., Aug. 15,
1955, 284 U.N.T.S. 93.
65. Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of State, Remarks to the Media (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www.state.gov/remarks-to-the-media-3/.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Concerning
the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3374, 500 U.N.T.S. 241.
69. Sarah Sanders, Press Secretary; Linda McMahon, Small Business Administrator; &
John Bolton, National Security Advisor, Press Briefing (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/press-briefing-press-secretary-sarahsanders-small-business-administrator-linda-mcmahon-national-security-advisor-100318/
[hereinafter Bolton Press Briefing].

137

International Law Studies

2021

International Court of Justice.” 70 He further declared, “The United States
will not sit idly by as baseless, politicized claims are brought against us.” 71
When questioned by reporters about these two decisions, he shared candidly:
Look, this is really — has less to do with Iran and the Palestinians than
with the continued consistent policy of the United States to reject the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, which we think is politicized
and ineffective. It relates, obviously, in part, to our views on the International Criminal Court and to the nature of so-called purported international
courts to be able to bind the United States. . . . It’s closing doors that
shouldn’t be opened to politicized abuse, which is what we’ve consistently
seen in the ICJ. 72

Thus, in explaining these two specific decisions to terminate U.S. treaty obligations, the Trump administration identified the philosophical underpinning of those decisions.
Regarding the viability of other existing third-party mechanisms for resolving international disputes under another treaty to which the United
States is a party, the Trump administration was also highly critical of the
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) dispute settlement bodies. In March
2019, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative issued its annual report to
Congress, which complained, “The WTO’s dispute settlement system, particularly at the Appellate Body level, has strayed extensively from original
understandings, substantially eroding the political sustainability of the current system.” 73 Consequently, the report declared, “We will not allow the
WTO Appellate Body and dispute settlement system to force the United
States into a straitjacket of obligations to which we never agreed.” 74 Likewise,
in January 2020, the Deputy U.S. Trade Representative and ambassador to
the WTO stated publicly at a ministerial meeting in Davos, Switzerland:
With respect to dispute settlement, the United States has repeatedly articulated our longstanding concerns with the functioning of the Appellate
Body. Let me be clear: the Appellate Body is not a court and its members
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2019 TRADE POLICY
AGENDA AND 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 102 (2019), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2019_Trade_Policy_Agenda_and_2018_Annual_Report.pdf.
74. Id. at 27.
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are not judges. Its role is a very limited one—to review the legal findings
of panels to correct for egregious errors. The Appellate Body must not
engage in fact-finding and its rulings do not constitute binding precedent
absent undefined “cogent reasons.” The Appellate Body must not issue
advisory opinions unrelated to resolving a dispute and it may not add to or
diminish the rights and obligations of WTO members. The Appellate Body
must decide appeals within a 90-day deadline, as mandated by the DSU
[Dispute Settlement Understanding] and it has no right to appoint its own
members. The Appellate Body was meant to be a component of the dispute settlement system, not its centerpiece. 75

Given these concerns, the Trump administration opposed the reappointment of members WTO Appellate Body as their terms expired, which resulted in reducing the number of members below that necessary for a
quorum, thereby tactically preventing the body from taking actions in pending and new cases. 76
Lastly, the Department of State during Trump’s presidency never published a treaty priority list. Customarily, the treaty priority list has been a tool
that previous presidents and their administrations utilized to communicate
on which treaties they wanted the Senate to focus its attention when providing its constitutional advice and consent. 77 As the Legal Adviser to the Department of State in the previous presidential administration explained in a
speech delivered three months before leaving office:
It’s also important for the executive branch and Senate to prioritize work
on treaties. For the executive branch’s part, this requires giving early and
consistent attention to treaties and how they fit into a broader policy
agenda. This can be done in part through of the “treaty priority list” that
75. Dennis Shea, U.S. Deputy Trade Representative and Ambassador to the World
Trade Organization, Statement at the Davos Informal WTO Ministerial Gathering (Jan. 24,
2020), https://geneva.usmission.gov/2020/01/27/statement-by-ambassador-shea-at-davos-informal-wto-ministerial-gathering/.
76. BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, LSB10385, THE WTO’S APPELLATE BODY LOSES ITS QUORUM: IS THIS THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR THE
“RULES-BASED TRADING SYSTEM”? (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10385.
77. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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the State Department usually transmits to the Congress at the beginning of
a new Congress. 78

Of note, the three presidential administrations immediately preceding
the Trump administration (i.e., Clinton, Bush, and Obama) issued treaty priority lists that included UNCLOS. But over President Trump’s four years in
office, his administration did not submit a treaty priority list to the Senate. 79
The non-issuance of such a prioritized list raises reasonable questions
whether any pending treaty was a “priority” for action for the United States
under his administration.
Given all of these concerns expressed and demonstrated by the Trump
administration, one might wonder what this means for the U.S. perspective
of the South China Sea arbitration ruling. The Trump administration demonstrated a preference for negotiating and concluding bilateral agreements. It
was also extremely skeptical of joining multilateral treaties and UNCLOS is
famously known as the multilateral “Constitution for the Oceans.” 80 Moreover, unlike his three immediate predecessors, President Trump did not
make it a policy priority for the United States to accede to UNCLOS. Additionally, his administration’s views on the International Court of Justice 81
may have extended to all international dispute resolution mechanisms. Each
of these data points raises potential questions about the extent to which the
U.S. perspective under the Trump administration assessed the value and viability of the tribunal’s ruling in the South China Sea arbitration. Moreover,
78. Brian J. Egan, U.S. Department of State Legal Adviser, Remarks at Yale-Duke Foreign Relations Law Roundtable: The Future of International Agreements (Oct. 15, 2016),
https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/263221.htm.
79. See Curtis Bradley, Oona Hathaway & Jack Goldsmith, The Death of Article II Treaties?, LAWFARE (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/death-article-ii-treaties. Additionally, a Google search for any references to “treaty priority list” subsequent to January
20, 2017 (i.e., the date of President Trump’s inauguration) produced negative results (last
search conducted on Jan. 6, 2021).
80. Tommy T.B. Koh, Ambassador-at-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore,
Remarks to the Final Session of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea: A
Constitution for the Oceans (Dec. 11, 1982), https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 69–72.

140

U.S. Perspective on SCS Arbitration Ruling

Vol. 97

it complicated any effort by the U.S. government to criticize China for not
complying with the tribunal’s ruling. 82
B. U.S. Policy on China
Next, consider President Trump’s foreign policy on China, including, but
not limited to, his administration’s policy on U.S.-China relations. Relative
to the Obama administration, the Trump administration was arguably more
realistic in assessing and more direct in describing the significance of China’s
international behavior.
The Trump administration openly emphasized the nature of the relationship between the United States and China as competition. President Obama
sought early on to cultivate and maintain a positive relationship with China,
but eventually began to recognize China’s posture in the international arena
was changing in a way that was impacting U.S. interests. In his first National
Security Strategy, he declared, “[The United States] will continue to pursue a
positive, constructive and comprehensive relationship with China.” 83 In his
second National Security Strategy, the Obama administration had refined the
envisioned nature of the U.S.-China relationship to be a “constructive”
one. 84 While seeking cooperation when possible, President Obama recognized that the United States and China were competing in some international
situations and some elements of their bilateral relationship: “While there will
be competition, we reject the inevitability of confrontation. At the same
82. See John B. Bellinger III, The Trump Administration's Approach to International Law and
Courts: Are We Seeing a Turn for the Worse?, 51 CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7, 20–21 (2019)
A [U.S.] withdrawal from the two Iran cases [before the International Court of Justice]
might be popular with some critics of international courts, but it would further damage the
reputation of the United States as a country committed to international law. It would also
make it virtually impossible for the United States to criticize China, or any other country,
that refuses to appear before an international tribunal.

During the George W. Bush administration, Bellinger served as Legal Advisor to the National Security Council and as Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State.
83. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 43 (2010), https://obama
whitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf
[hereinafter 2010 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY].
84. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 24 (2015), https://obama
whitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf
[hereinafter 2015 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY].
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time, we will manage competition from a position of strength while insisting
that China uphold international rules and norms on issues ranging from maritime security to trade and human rights.” 85 Yet, the Obama administration
apparently sought to downplay the competition element, particularly in the
security dimension. For example, three months before President Obama
concluded his second term; the White House reportedly directed the Pentagon to avoid the word “competition” when describing the relationship between the United States and China. 86
Less than one year into office, President Trump issued his one and only
National Security Strategy, which perceived the U.S.-China relationship in a significantly different way. This Strategy did not merely use the word “competition” to describe the U.S. relationship with China, but it notably elevated
“great power competition” 87 with China to the top of the U.S. list of security
concerns.
The Trump administration also candidly described the ways in which
China’s international behavior challenged the existing international rulesbased order. Perhaps given his education and background as an attorney,
President Obama strategically emphasized the importance of preserving an
international order based upon rules. His first National Security Strategy declared, “As [the United States] did after World War II, we must pursue a
rules-based international system that can advance our own interests by serving mutual interests.” 88 Similarly, his second National Security Strategy “affirm[ed] America’s leadership role within a rules-based international order
that works best through empowered citizens, responsible States and effective regional and international organizations.” 89 It also recognized that “our
rules-based system is now competing against alternative, less-open models,” 90 without identifying who were the actual proponents of those alternative systems. Yet, occasionally he did discuss China’s behavior in relation to
85. Id.
86. David B. Larter, White House Tells Pentagon to Quit Talking about “Competition” with
China, NAVYTIMES (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.navytimes.com/news/yournavy/2016/09/26/white-house-tells-the-pentagon-to-quit-talking-about-competitionwith-china/.
27
(2017),
87.
WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-20170905.pdf [hereinafter 2017 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY].
88. 2010 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 83, at 1.
89. 2015 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 84, at 1.
90. Id. at 15.
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the rules-based international order, albeit with an exhortatory tone. For example, at the 2011 APEC Summit, President Obama stated, “[W]hat I’ve
said since I first came into office and what we’ve exhibited in terms of our
interactions with the Chinese, is we want you to play by the rules.” 91
Like Trump’s approach to describing the competitive nature of the U.S.China relationship, President Trump also highlighted how China deliberately
sought to undermine the international order, including the rules component
of that order. Specifically, Trump’s National Security Strategy assessed that
China seeks to “deny America access” and “change the international order
in [its] favor.” 92 In general, the Strategy declared it is “vital to U.S. prosperity
and security” that “international institutions” that establish the “rules” for
how States “interact with each other” will “uphold the rules that keep these
common domains open and free.” 93 Additionally, it recognized that States in
the Asia-Pacific region were “calling for sustained U.S. leadership in a collective response that upholds a regional order respectful of sovereignty and
independence.” 94 More recently, Trump’s White House published the United
States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China in May 2020, which also
identified China’s efforts to undermine those international rules. Specifically,
it observed: “The [Chinese Communist Party (CCP)] has chosen instead to
exploit the free and open rules-based order and attempt to reshape the international system in its favor. Beijing openly acknowledges that it seeks to
transform the international order to align with CCP interests and ideology.” 95
In response, the White House declared, “[T]he United States does not and
will not accommodate Beijing’s actions that weaken a free, open and rulesbased international order.” 96
A noteworthy example of the Trump administration’s more direct approach to criticizing China’s international behavior that challenged the existing rules-based international order was how it highlighted China’s efforts to
restrict the maritime freedom of other States, including the United States.
91. President Barack Obama, Remarks at the APEC CEO Business Summit, Honolulu,
Hawaii (Nov. 12, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/
2011/11/12/remarks-president-obama-apec-ceo-business-summit-qa.
92. 2017 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 87, at 27.
93. Id. at 40.
94. Id.
95. WHITE HOUSE, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC APPROACH TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1 (2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/
05/U.S.-Strategic-Approach-to-The-Peoples-Republic-of-China-Report-5.24v1.pdf.
96. Id. at 8.
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When discussing U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region generally, the
Obama administration began messaging in public diplomacy that the United
States will “fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows.” 97 Often,
senior administration officials employed this message without expressly linking it to China, 98 even though many listeners and readers might have assumed that this universally-phrased message was about China. The Trump
administration, however, arguably took it to the next level. Senior officials
consistently echoed the substance of the “fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows” message. 99 But additionally, those officials linked this
97. The first known public usage of the “fly, sail and operate wherever international
law allows” is believed to be by Ash Carter, in which he said,
[T]he United States will continue to protect freedom of navigation and overflight—principles that have ensured security and prosperity in this region for decades. There should be
no mistake: the United States will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, as
U.S. forces do all over the world.

Ash Carter, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Address at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue: A Regional
Security Architecture Where Everyone Rises (May 30, 2015), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/606676/iiss-shangri-la-dialogue-a-regional-security-architecture-where-everyone-rises/; see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ASIA-PACIFIC MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY preface (2015), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF (“As it does around the world, the Department will
continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, in support of these goals
and in order to preserve the peace and security the Asia-Pacific region has enjoyed for the
past 70 years.”).
98. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks at the U.S.-ASEAN Press Conference,
(Feb. 16, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/16/remarks-president-obama-us-asean-press-conference (“Freedom of navigation must be upheld and lawful commerce should not be impeded. I reiterated that the United States will
continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows and we will support the
right of all countries to do the same.”); see also Ash Carter, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore (June 5, 2016), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/791472/remarks-by-secretarycarter-and-qa-at-the-shangri-la-dialogue-singapore/ (“As I affirmed here last year and
America’s Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea have demonstrated,
the United States will continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, so
that everyone in the region can do the same.”).
99. See, e.g., James Mattis, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue (June 3, 2017), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1201780/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-at-shangri-la-dialogue/ [hereinafter Mattis, Re-
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message directly to China and concerns about China’s international behavior. This included linkages during public speeches about the Trump administration’s policy regarding China, 100 remarks during press briefings about
marks at the Shangri-La Dialogue] (“We will continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows and demonstrate resolve through operational presence in the South
China Sea and beyond.”); see also James Mattis, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Remarks at the
Plenary Session of the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue (June 2, 2018), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1538599/remarks-by-secretarymattis-at-plenary-session-of-the-2018-shangri-la-dialogue/ [hereinafter Mattis, Remarks at
the Plenary Session of the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue]
We will continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows and demonstrate
resolve through operational presence in the South China Sea and beyond. Our operations
throughout the region are an expression of our willingness to defend both our interests and
the freedoms enshrined in international law.

Mark T. Esper, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Remarks at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam,
Hanoi, Vietnam (Nov. 20, 2019), https://vn.usembassy.gov/secretary-of-defense-mark-tesper-remarks-at-diplomatic-academy-of-vietnam/
We will not accept attempts to assert unlawful maritime claims at the expense of law-abiding
nations. The United States military will continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows and we will encourage other nations to affirm their rights in the same
manner. Freedom of Navigation Operations remain central to our demonstration of leadership in upholding the rules-based order.

100. See, e.g., Vice-President Mike Pence, Remarks on the Administration’s Policy Toward China, The Hudson Institute (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/
China’s aggression was on display this week, when a Chinese naval vessel came within 45
yards of the USS Decatur as it conducted freedom-of-navigation operations in the South
China Sea, forcing our ship to quickly maneuver to avoid collision. Despite such reckless
harassment, the United States Navy will continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows and our national interests demand. We will not be intimidated and we will
not stand down.

See also Vice-President Mike Pence, Remarks at the Fredric V. Malek Memorial Lecture,
(Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-frederic-v-malek-memorial-lecture/
And to make it clear to Beijing that no nation has a right to claim the maritime commons
as territorial seas, the United States, in the last year, has increased the tempo and scope of
our freedom of navigation operations and strengthened our military presence across the
Indo-Pacific.
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China’s military development, 101 and in private meetings between senior U.S.
officials and their Chinese counterparts. 102
Admittedly, none of these discussions about China’s international behavior expressly mentions the arbitration ruling. But they do highlight the
U.S. perspective under the Trump administration on the “great power competition” between the United States and China, in which senior U.S. officials
characterized the United States as seeking to “uphold” the rules-based international order and China as attempting to “reshape” and “transform” that
order. If the authority of the South China Sea arbitral tribunal to issue legallybinding rulings that interpret and apply UNCLOS is an element of that rulesbased international order, then an argument could be made that the Trump
administration implicitly endorsed what that tribunal’s ruling represents for
the rules-based international order as it pertains to China’s excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea and its attempts to restrict the maritime
rights and freedom of other countries.

101. See, e.g., Randall Schriver, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security
Affairs, Press Briefing on the 2019 Report on Military and Security Developments in China
(May 3, 2019), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1837011/assistant-secretary-of-defense-for-indo-pacific-security-affairs-schriverpress/
I don't know what steps China will take beyond what they've already done. I think those
steps at militarizing the outposts are designed with a certain aim. And they seek to operationalize an illegal expansive sovereignty claim; basically everything inside the Nine-Dash
Line, or the entire South China Sea. So what we'd do about it is, we fly, sail and operate
where international law allows, we're increasingly joined by other countries, to make sure
that no one country can change international law and international norms, that that water
remains international water; in other words, making that investment that the Chinese have
made as insignificant as possible, particularly where their core goal is aimed at.

102. See, e.g., James Mattis, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Remarks at Press Availability,
(Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.state.gov/press-availability-with-secretary-of-defense-jamesmattis-chinese-politburo-member-yang-jiechi-and-chinese-state-councilor-and-defenseminister-general-wei-fenghe/ (“And we made clear [to Chinese leaders] that the United
States will continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows.”).
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C. U.S. Policy on the South China Sea Situation
Last, consider President Trump’s policy on the South China Sea situation.
Prior to President Trump entering office, the Bush, 103 Clinton, 104 and
Obama 105 administrations had collectively developed and refined several
103. Jonathan G. Odom, A China in the Bull Shop?, Comparing the Rhetoric of a Rising China
with the Reality of the International Law of the Sea, 17 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL 201
(2012), https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1051&
context=oclj (Undersecretary of State Robert Zoellick summarizing the George H. W. Bush
administration’s views on the South China Sea as follows: the United States would not make
judgments on the merits of the claims, wanted freedom of navigation to be preserved, and
supported a peaceful resolution of disputes).
104. See, e.g., Christine Shelly, Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, Press Briefing,
(May 10, 1995), quoted in MICHAEL MEDEVITT, THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: ASSESSING U.S.
POLICY AND OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 1 (2014), https://www.cna.org/
cna_files/pdf/iop-2014-u-009109.pdf [hereinafter Shelly Press Briefing]
The United States is concerned that a pattern of unilateral actions and reactions in the South
China Sea has increased tensions in that region. The United States strongly opposes the use
or threat of force to resolve competing claims and urges all claimants to exercise restraint
and to avoid destabilizing actions. The United States has an abiding interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea. The United States calls upon claimants
to intensify diplomatic efforts which address issues related to competing claims, taking into
account the interests of all parties and which contribute to peace and prosperity in the region. The United States is willing to assist in any way that claimants deem helpful. The
United States reaffirms its welcome of the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China
Sea. Maintaining freedom of navigation is a fundamental interest of the United States. Unhindered navigation by all ships and aircraft in the South China Sea is essential for the peace
and prosperity of the entire Asia-Pacific region, including the United States. The United
States takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims to sovereignty over the
various islands, reefs, atolls and cays in the South China Sea. The United States would,
however, view with serious concern any maritime claim, or restriction on maritime activity,
in the South China Sea that was not consistent with international law, including the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

105. See, e.g., Hillary Clinton, U.S. Secretary of State, Remarks at Press Availability, National Convention Center, Hanoi, Vietnam (July 23, 2010), https://20092017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/07/145095.htm
The United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open
access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China
Sea. We share these interests not only with ASEAN members or ASEAN Regional Forum
participants, but with other maritime nations and the broader international community. The
United States supports a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the
various territorial disputes without coercion. We oppose the use or threat of force by any
claimant. While the United States does not take sides on the competing territorial disputes
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over land features in the South China Sea, we believe claimants should pursue their territorial claims and accompanying rights to maritime space in accordance with the UN convention on the law of the sea. Consistent with customary international law, legitimate claims to
maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to
land features. The U.S. supports the 2002 ASEAN-China declaration on the conduct of
parties in the South China Sea. We encourage the parties to reach agreement on a full code
of conduct. The U.S. is prepared to facilitate initiatives and confidence building measures
consistent with the declaration. Because it is in the interest of all claimants and the broader
international community for unimpeded commerce to proceed under lawful conditions.
Respect for the interests of the international community and responsible efforts to address
these unresolved claims and help create the conditions for resolution of the disputes and a
lowering of regional tensions.

See also John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of State, Remarks on U.S.-China Relations at John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC (Nov. 4, 2014),
https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/11/233705.htm [hereinafter Kerry
Statement]
The United States is not a claimant and we do not take a position on the various territorial
claims of others. But we take a strong position on how those claims are pursued and how
those disputes are going to be resolved. So, we are deeply concerned about mounting tension in the South China Sea and we consistently urge all the parties to pursue claims in
accordance with international law, to exercise self-restraint, to peacefully resolve disputes
and to make rapid, meaningful progress to complete a code of conduct that will help reduce
the potential for conflict in the years to come. And the United States will work, without
getting involved in the merits of the claim, on helping that process to be effectuated, because doing so brings greater stability, brings more opportunity for cooperation in other
areas.

See also John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of State, Remarks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang
Yi, Washington, DC, Feb. 23, 2016, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/02/253164.htm
We also talked today about the importance of reducing tensions and maintaining the space
necessary for diplomatic solutions to the competing claims in the South China Sea. As I
said in our meeting, we believe that it is important for a diplomatic solution, for a solution
to occur which follows the rule of law that brings the countries to the table for a negotiated
resolution not for unilateral actions. We want to halt the expansion and the militarization
of occupied features. We think everybody benefits by true demilitarization, non-militarization. We also urge people to clarify the territorial and maritime claims in accordance with
international law and to commit to peacefully resolve and manage disputes, including
through the use of such international mechanisms as authentic bilateral or multilateral negotiations or arbitration. I also reiterated the commitment of the United States of America
to freedom of navigation and over-flight, something which China says it does not stand in
the way of; it agrees that there should be peaceful freedom of navigation. I stressed that any
enforcement by any party of maritime claims by deploying their own aircraft over disputed
areas are not compatible with the freedoms of navigation and of skies of access to flight
operations.
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basic tenets of U.S. policy in the South China Sea region. These consistently
included efforts to protect several U.S. national interests: (1) maintaining regional stability, (2) upholding respect for international law, (3) preserving
maritime freedom and (4) promoting peaceful resolution of disputes.
A review of official statements by President Trump and senior Trump
administration officials shows relative consistency with these elements of
longstanding U.S. policy for the South China Sea. For example, during President Trump’s first year in office, he concluded a series of joint statements
with his counterparts from several East Asian States, including Malaysia, 106
106. Joint Statement for Enhancing the Comprehensive Partnership between the
United States of America and Malaysia (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/joint-statement-enhancing-comprehensive-partnership-united-statesamerica-malaysia/
Prime Minister Najib and President Trump discussed matters relating to the South China
Sea and emphasized the importance of ensuring, maintaining and safeguarding peace and
stability, maritime security, freedom of navigation and over-flight and other lawful uses of
the seas. The two leaders underscored the importance of upholding and adhering to the
rules-based maritime order. They called upon all disputing parties to implement their international legal obligations in good faith and to avoid the threat or use of force, intimidation,
or coercion. They further called on all disputing parties to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities and refrain from action that erodes trust and confidence and escalates
tension, including the militarization of outposts. The two leaders reaffirmed that all maritime claims must be based on and resolved in accordance with international law as reflected
in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
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the Philippines, 107 Vietnam, 108 Japan 109 and Singapore. 110 Each of these statements contained these fundamental elements of U.S. policy for the South
107. Joint Statement between the United States of America and the Republic of the
Philippines (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/jointstatement-united-states-america-republic-philippines/
Both sides reiterated their commitment to uphold their principles including the freedom of
navigation and overflight and the exercise of self-restraint. They stressed the importance of
peacefully resolving disputes in the South China Sea, in accordance with international law,
as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. They further underscored the need to continue pursuing confidence-building measures to increase mutual trust and confidence and
to refrain from actions that would escalate tensions, including militarization.

108. Joint Statement between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic
of Vietnam (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/jointstatement-united-states-america-republic-philippines/
The two leaders underscored the strategic importance to the international community of
free and open access to the South China Sea, the importance of unimpeded lawful commerce, the need to respect freedom of navigation and over-flight and other lawful uses of
the sea. The two sides reiterated the stance on the South China Sea in the previous United
States-Vietnam and United States-ASEAN joint statements, including their call on parties
to refrain from escalatory actions, the militarization of disputed features and unlawful restrictions on freedom of the seas. They reaffirmed their shared commitment to the peaceful
settlement of disputes in accordance with international law, including full respect for legal
and diplomatic processes. They called for the full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and an early conclusion
to an effective, legally binding Code of Conduct for the South China Sea (COC). They
further called for all South China Sea claimants to clarify and comport their maritime claims
in accordance with the international law of the sea as reflected in the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea and to implement their international legal obligations in
good faith in managing or resolving these disputes.

109. Joint Statement from President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
(Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-prime-minister-shinzo-abe/
The two leaders underscored the importance of maintaining a maritime order based on
international law, including freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of
the sea. The United States and Japan oppose any attempt to assert maritime claims through
the use of intimidation, coercion or force. The United States and Japan also call on countries
concerned to avoid actions that would escalate tensions in the South China Sea, including
the militarization of outposts and to act in accordance with international law.

110. Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Republic of Singapore,
Oct. 24, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-unitedstates-america-republic-singapore/
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China Sea. Similarly, at the 2017 APEC Summit, during Trump’s first visit
to the Asia-Pacific region, he emphasized that his regional vision for the
Indo-Pacific included “uphold[ing] principles that have benefitted all of us,
like respect for the rule of law, individual rights and freedom of navigation
and overflight, including open shipping lanes.” 111
Beyond that, President Trump appears to have gone one step further
than prior presidents in terms of offering direct assistance to manage and
resolve the South China Sea disputes. For example, under the Clinton administration, the State Department spokesperson stated, “The United States
is willing to assist in any way that claimants deem helpful,” without publicly
clarifying any specific ways for the United States to assist. 112 Elaborating on
ways the United States could assist, the U.S. secretary of state in the first
term of Obama’s presidency declared that the United States is “prepared to
facilitate initiatives and confidence building measures,” while her successor
in the second Obama term said that the United States “will work” on “helping” the process of finalizing a code of conduct in the South China Sea. 113
But President Trump appears to be the first president to have offered to play
a direct role in assisting the South China Sea claimant-States to resolve their
disputes. During his 2017 trip to the Asia-Pacific region, when meeting with
the president of Vietnam, he publicly stated:
South China Sea, as you know, we're looking at; we're looking at it together.
If I could help mediate or arbitrate, please let me know. And you've had a
dispute for quite a while with China. If I can help in any way, I'm a very
good mediator and a very good arbitrator. I have done plenty of it from
both sides. So if I can help you, let me know. 114
Both leaders noted concerns about developments in the South China Sea (SCS). They reaffirmed the importance of safeguarding peace and stability and they reiterated their commitment to upholding freedoms of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea.
Consonant with the Sunnylands Declaration, both leaders underscored the importance of
the peaceful resolution of disputes, including full respect for legal and diplomatic processes,
in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law and the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. They also reiterated their support for
the expeditious conclusion of an effective and binding Code of Conduct in the SCS.

111. APEC CEO Summit Remarks, supra note 56.
112. Shelly Press Briefing, supra note 104.
113. See Kerry Statement, supra note 105.
114. Remarks by President Donald J. Trump at Joint Press Conference, Hanoi, Vietnam (Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-priormeeting-with-president-tran-dai-quang-vietnam-hanoi-vietnam.
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A search of all subsequent public statements by President Trump has located
no additional references to this idea that he would directly arbitrate or mediate these disputes. 115 While never coming to fruition, this offer of direct
support or assistance at the presidential level appears to be a new development.
In terms of how President Trump’s unprecedented offer to mediate the
South China Sea disputes relates to the continuing viability of the tribunal’s
ruling, it can be argued both ways. On the one hand, a critic could argue that
such an offer by a U.S. president to mediate the disputes between South
China Sea claimants, particularly those between the Philippines and China,
ignored or disregarded the existence and validity of the arbitral tribunal’s
ruling. On the other hand, however, a realist could argue that the contemporary practice of States in resolving their territorial and maritime disputes
with other States is often non-linear in progression. In other words, a review
of the case history of many real-world disputes shows that the claimant
States often bounce among international courts and tribunals, arbitration,
mediation, and direct negotiations for a single or set of disputes, before they
eventually resolve them. Regardless, the personal nature of Trump’s offer to
mediate the disputes demonstrated that these disputes did achieve at least
some level of presidential attention during the Trump administration.
IV.

THE EXPRESS U.S. PERSPECTIVE ON THE TRIBUNAL’S RULING

By first examining the implied U.S. perspective on the tribunal’s ruling during the Trump administration, one might assume that an express U.S. perspective on the South China Sea arbitration did not exist during those four
years. To the contrary, there were several government public statements and
official documents, including by Trump administration officials other than
President Trump himself, which did expressly reference the ruling. But reviewing the Trump administration’s philosophical approach to foreign policy, as well as its specific policies on China and the South China Sea, help to
provide the context of the administration’s explicit invocations of the tribunal’s ruling. Moreover, examining the Trump administration’s foreign policy
more generally reveals that there might have been some credibility challenges
or logical disconnects between what the U.S. government was implicitly say115. A search of President Trump’s speeches, statements, and documents, conducted
online of The American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/, produced
negative results (last search conducted on Jan. 6, 2021).
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ing or doing and what it was expressly saying and doing. To derive the express U.S. perspective on the tribunal’s ruling, the official words and State
actions of the government will be considered, particularly those occurring
after the arbitral tribunal issued its final award in July 2016 until the end of
President Trump’s four years in office.
A. U.S. Statements about the Tribunal’s Ruling
As mentioned previously, President Trump did not personally comment on
the arbitration ruling itself. But senior Trump administration officials did
make public remarks about the ruling. The Trump administration also issued
a number of high-level documents that referenced the ruling. Below is a review of the remarks and documents in which the United States continued to
invoke the ruling and its significance.
Senior diplomats in the Trump administration invoked the tribunal’s ruling. Both of Trump’s secretaries of state issued joint statements with close
U.S. allies that favorably endorsed the ruling. In August 2017, then-Secretary
of State Rex Tillerson issued a joint statement with Australia’s Foreign Minister Julie Bishop and Japan’s Foreign Minister Taro Kono, which stated:
The ministers called on China and the Philippines to abide by the Arbitral
Tribunal’s 2016 Award in the Philippines-China arbitration, as it is final
and legally binding on both parties. The ministers noted the significance of
the UNCLOS dispute settlement regime and the Tribunal’s decision in discussions among parties in their efforts to peacefully resolve their maritime
disputes in the SCS. 116

Two years later, in August 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo similarly
issued a joint statement with Australia’s Foreign Minister Marise Payne and
Japan’s Foreign Minister Kono: “The Ministers underscored the importance
of the July 2016 Philippines-China Arbitral Tribunal’s award and noted that
the Tribunal’s award is final and legally binding for the two parties.” 117
In October 2019, Assistant Secretary of State David Stillwell testified
before a committee of the Senate. The scheduled purpose of the hearing was
116. Australia-Japan-United States Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Ministerial Joint Statement (Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.state.gov/australia-japan-united-states-trilateral-strategic-dialogue-ministerial-joint-statement/.
117. Trilateral [Australia-Japan-United States] Strategic Dialogue Joint Ministerial Statement (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.state.gov/trilateral-strategic-dialogue-joint-ministerialstatement-august-1-2019/.
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to discuss U.S. policy in the Indo-Pacific region and the implementation of
the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018. But during Assistant Secretary
Stilwell’s opening statement, he said the following about some of China’s
maritime claims:
PRC maritime claims in the South China Sea, exemplified by the preposterous nine-dashed line, are both unlawful and unreasonable. These claims,
which are without legal, historic, or geographic merit, impose real costs on
other countries. Through repeated provocative actions to assert the ninedashed line, Beijing is inhibiting ASEAN members from accessing over
$2.5 trillion in recoverable energy reserves, while contributing to instability
and the risk of conflict. 118

While Stilwell did not expressly reference the tribunal’s ruling in this portion
of his sworn testimony, his characterization of China’s nine-dashed line as
“unlawful” and “without legal merit” was in full conformity with the substance of the ruling.
In June 2020, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations submitted a
three-page letter to the U.N. Secretary-General, which invoked the tribunal’s
ruling. It was written in response to China’s December 2019 note verbale to
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. In particular, it objected to China’s unlawful claim to “historic rights,” any claim by China to
draw straight baselines around South China Sea island groups and resulting
internal waters, and any claimed maritime entitlements by China derived
from submerged features in the South China Sea. 119 After identifying these
specific objections, the letter stated, “These positions are consistent with the
decision of the Tribunal in The South China Sea Arbitration.” 120 In the letter’s conclusion, the United States “urges China to conform its maritime
claims to international law as reflected in the Convention; to comply with the
118. ARIA (Asia Reassurance Initiative Act) in Action, Part 3: Implementation and the IndoPacific Strategy, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on East Asia, the Pacific and International Cybersecurity
Policy of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 116th Cong 114 (2019) (statement of David R.
Stilwell, Assistant Secretary Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of
State), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10 16 19 -- ARIA in Action - Implementation and the Indo-Pacific Strategy.pdf [hereinafter Stilwell Statement].
119. Letter from Ambassador Kelly Craft, U.S. Representative to the United Nations,
to António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations (June 1, 2020),
https://usun.usmission.gov/protesting-chinas-unlawful-maritime-claims-at-the-un/.
120. Id.
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Tribunal’s July 12, 2016 decision; and to cease its provocative activities in the
South China Sea.” 121
Of note, Ambassador Craft’s letter enclosed a copy of the diplomatic
note the United States had delivered to China in December 2016 under the
Obama administration. 122 Immediately after Ambassador Craft issued her
letter, Secretary of State Pompeo tweeted the letter, stating, “Today, the U.S.
protests the PRC’s unlawful South China Sea maritime claims at the @UN.
We reject these claims as unlawful and dangerous. Member States must unite
to uphold international law and freedom of the seas.” 123 To summarize, one
month before the fourth anniversary of the arbitral tribunal’s ruling, the senior-most diplomat in the Trump administration publicly reaffirmed the
three-year-old diplomatic position taken by the prior presidential administration, which protested China’s illegal maritime claims and favorably endorsed
the tribunal’s ruling.
Most recently, and perhaps most significantly, Secretary Pompeo issued
a statement on the fourth anniversary of the arbitral tribunal’s ruling. After
invoking President Trump’s vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” it reiterated the longstanding U.S. national interests in the South China Sea. 124 It
went on to criticize China’s nine-dash line and expressly invoked the tribunal’s ruling:
In a unanimous decision on July 12, 2016, an Arbitral Tribunal constituted
under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention—to which the PRC is a state
party—rejected the PRC’s maritime claims as having no basis in international law. The Tribunal sided squarely with the Philippines, which brought
the arbitration case, on almost all claims. 125

Like previous statements by senior officials, it restated the binding nature of
the tribunal’s ruling: “As the United States has previously stated and as specifically provided in the Convention, the Arbitral Tribunal’s decision is final
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
123. U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo (@SecPompeo), TWITTER (June 2, 2020,
12:52 PM), https://twitter.com/SecPompeo/status/1267861621965303809.
124. Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of State, Press Statement, U.S. Position on
Maritime Claims in the South China Sea (July 13, 2020), https://www.state.gov/u-s-position-on-maritime-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/.
125. Id.
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and legally binding on both parties.” 126 Up to this point, the July 2020 statement broke no new ground in terms of U.S. policy on the South China Sea
generally or the tribunal’s ruling specifically. But then the statement declared,
“Today we are aligning the U.S. position on the PRC’s maritime claims in
the SCS with the Tribunal’s decision.” 127
Following this declaration, the statement elaborated on three specific
ways it was aligning U.S. policy with the tribunal’s ruling. First, the United
States would not recognize any claim by China to an EEZ for any high-tide
elevation located within the Philippines EEZ. The United States would also
not recognize any territorial or maritime claim by China to Mischief Reef or
Second Thomas Shoal, given that both features are submerged and located
within the Philippines’ EEZ. Second, the United States would not recognize
any maritime claim by China for any of the Spratly Islands beyond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea. Third, the United States would not recognize any
territorial or maritime claim by China to James Shoal, given that this feature
is submerged and located within Malaysia’s EEZ. Thus, while this July 2020
statement was titled “Maritime Claims in the South China Sea,” it was focused primarily on actions by China that have negatively impacted the South
China Sea situation.
On the same day Secretary Pompeo issued this statement, Assistant Secretary Stilwell delivered remarks at the CSIS annual South China Sea Conference. In his speech, he described the tribunal’s ruling as “a historic statement on international law in the South China Sea,” highlighting that the tribunal’s ruling was “unanimous.” 128 He also pointed out, “The tribunal sided
squarely with the Philippines on the bulk of its legal claims.” 129 But he criticized China for trying to “delegitimize and ignore the verdict, despite its obligations to abide by it as a party to [UNCLOS].” 130 After these remarks
about the tribunal’s ruling and other introductory comments about China’s
negative actions in the South China Sea, Secretary Stillwell then presented
Secretary Pompeo’s statement on U.S. policy in the South China Sea, which
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. David R. Stilwell, Assistant Secretary Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
U.S. Department of State, Remarks for the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(Virtual): The South China Sea, Southeast Asia’s Patrimony and Everybody’s Own Backyard
(July 14, 2020), https://www.state.gov/the-south-china-sea-southeast-asias-patrimonyand-everybodys-own-backyard/.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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he acknowledged was issued “on the occasion of the anniversary of the 2016
tribunal ruling.” 131 In addition to these statements by Secretary Pompeo and
Assistant Secretary Stilwell, the spokesperson for the Department of State
has also repeatedly invoked the tribunal’s ruling, both in press releases and
in press briefings. 132
Senior defense officials within the Trump administration also publicly
invoked the tribunal’s ruling. While serving during the first two years of
Trump’s presidency, Secretary of Defense James Mattis commented favorably about the arbitral ruling in speeches at the Shangri-La Dialogue held in
Singapore annually and attended by senior defense officials from throughout
the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere. In his 2017 speech, Secretary Mattis
reminded the audience, “The 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the case brought by the Philippines on the South China Sea is
binding. We call on all claimants to use this as a starting point to peacefully
manage their disputes in the South China Sea.” 133 His prepared remarks for
the 2018 event did not refer to the arbitration or the ruling. But when answering a question by a dialogue participant from the Philippines, Secretary
Mattis bluntly stated, “[W]e have been on the record about international tribunals that say there is no such thing as a nine-dash line, or is no legal basis
for this—we stand by international law. We stand by international tribunals.” 134
131. Id.
132. For example, the U.S. State Department’s spokesperson made detailed remarks
honoring the three-year anniversary of the ruling. These remarks highlighted the significance
of the ruling as “a victory for the rule of law,” and reiterated several key elements of the
ruling. Morgan Ortagus, Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, Department Press Briefing (July. 11, 2019), https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-july-112019/. In April 2020, the same spokesperson released a press statement about a reported
Chinese sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel in the South China Sea. Within that press
statement, she noted: “China’s Nine-Dashed Line was deemed an unlawful maritime claim
by an arbitral tribunal convened under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention in July 2016, a
position shared by the U.S. Government.” Morgan Ortagus, Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, Press Statement: PRC’s Reported Sinking of a Vietnamese Fishing Vessel in
the South China Sea (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.state.gov/prcs-reported-sinking-of-a-vietnamese-fishing-vessel-in-the-south-china-sea/.
133. Mattis, Remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue, supra note 99.
134. Mattis, Remarks at the Plenary Session of the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue, supra
note 99.
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In 2019, Mark Esper succeeded Mattis as Secretary of Defense. Due to
the COVID-19 pandemic, the organizers of the Shangri-La Dialogue decided not to convene the annual summit, so Secretary Esper did not have an
opportunity to speak about the tribunal’s ruling at this multilateral forum.
But he did discuss the ruling at an ASEAN-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting, hosted by Thailand in November 2019. He reportedly told his ASEAN
counterparts:
China’s activities there are a threat not only to other claimants and to many
Southeast Asian nations, but to all trading nations who value freedom of
the seas and the peaceful settlement of disputes . . . . (China’s) maritime
claims in the South China Sea, exemplified by the illegitimate nine-dash
line, are both unlawful and unreasonable and counter to the July 2016 ruling of the UNCLOS Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. 135

Thus, regardless of senior leadership changes, the Trump administration
continued to reference the tribunal’s ruling and criticize China for disregarding it.
Senior military officials during the Trump administration also invoked
the tribunal’s ruling. This includes annual testimony by the top commander
in the Asia-Pacific region before the Senate Armed Services Committee. In
2017, during his first opportunity to testify about the tribunal ruling after its
issuance, Admiral Harry Harris stated the following:
The past year included some major developments in the status of these
disputes. The landmark ruling by the Arbitral Tribunal under the Law of
the Sea Convention (the Tribunal) in July 2016 addressed the status of features and maritime claims specified in the Philippines’ arbitration case.
While the tribunal did not rule on the sovereignty of specific features, the
tribunal did declare a number of China’s maritime claims and actions unlawful. However, China ignored the ruling and maintains and even articulated new excessive maritime claims throughout the South China Sea. All
the activities underway before the ruling, including the militarization of the
135. US Defense Sec. Esper Slams China in Meeting with ASEAN Counterparts, ABS-CBN
NEWS (Nov. 17, 2019), https://news.abs-cbn.com/overseas/11/17/19/us-defense-sec-esper-slams-china-in-meeting-with-asean-counterparts.
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artificial landforms created by China and the provocative actions of military
and law enforcement forces, continue unabated. 136

In 2018, Admiral Harris was succeeded in command by Admiral Philip
Davidson. During his February 2019 testimony on the U.S. military’s force
posture in the Indo-Pacific region, Admiral Davidson also spoke about the
tribunal’s ruling. He stated the following:
Beijing maintains maritime claims in the South China Sea that are contrary
to international law and pose a substantial long-term threat to the rulesbased international order. Beijing ignored the 2016 ruling of an Arbitral
Tribunal established under Annex VII of the Law of the Sea Convention,
which concluded that China’s claims to historic rights, or other sovereign
rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of the South China
Sea encompassed by the “nine-dash line” are contrary to UNCLOS and
without legal effect. 137

Taken together, the testimony of these two senior military commanders
collectively identified some of what the United States perceives as the key
elements of the tribunal’s ruling, including the invalidation of China’s claims
to a nine-dashed line and historic rights in the South China Sea. Furthermore, they highlighted how China has “ignored the ruling” and assessed that
such disregard for the tribunal’s ruling demonstrated how China poses a
threat to the “rules-based international order.”
In addition to these public speeches and congressional testimony by senior defense and military officials, the Department of Defense in the Trump
administration also invoked the tribunal ruling in its published reports. Each
year, the Secretary of Defense is required by law to produce and submit to
Congress a report on military and security developments involving China. 138
136. Hearing to Receive Testimony on United States Pacific Command and United States Force
Korea Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Admiral Harry
B. Harris Jr., U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Harris_04-27-17.pdf.
137. Hearing to Receive Testimony on the United States Indo-Pacific Command and United States
Forces Korea in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2020 and the Future Years
Defense Program Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Admiral Philip S. Davidson, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command),
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Davidson_02-12-19.pdf.
138. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65, §
1202, 113 Stat. 512, 781 (1999).
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Following the tribunal’s final ruling in 2016, the annual reports for 2017, 139
2018, 140 and 2019 141 discussed the ruling. Of note, the 2017 report devoted
139. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

2017, at i (2017), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Report.PDF [hereinafter 2017 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS]
In the South China Sea, China continued construction at its military outposts in the Spratly
Islands. Important milestones in 2016 included landing civilian aircraft on its airfields on
Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief Reefs, as well as landing a military transport aircraft on Fiery
Cross Reef. In July 2016, an arbitral tribunal constituted under the compulsory dispute settlement procedures in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), issued a ruling in favor of the Philippines with respect to issues involving the interpretation
and application of the LOSC. Among other things, the tribunal ruled that China’s “ninedash line” cannot represent a lawful maritime claim to the extent that any of the claims it
reflects would exceed the limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the Convention.
The tribunal did not rule on sovereignty claims to land features, an issue that is outside the
scope of the Convention. China rejected the ruling.

140. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

2018, at 12–13 (2018), https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF [hereinafter 2018 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS]
In 2017, China continued increased outreach to the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei to
maintain momentum toward its goal of effectively controlling disputed areas in the South
China Sea. These overtures follow the July 2016 arbitration ruling in the case brought by
the Philippines against China under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC). This
ruling included findings that China violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights within the Philippines’ EEZ; that China has no basis on which to claim historic rights within the nine[]dash line to the extent that any claim exceeds maritime entitlements China could claim
under the LOSC; and that Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Reed Bank
do not generate maritime entitlements. The tribunal did not rule on sovereignty claims to
land features. In response to the ruling, China continued to claim historic rights in the South
China Sea and made a separate assertion of a right to “internal” waters within entire island
groups (rather than from individual features as set out in the LOSC). This likely references
China’s unlawful straight baseline claims around the Paracel Islands and potential drawing
of similarly unlawful straight baselines around three other South China Sea island groups
claimed by China. Since the arbitration ruling, China has managed tensions with regional
claimants and largely continued its operations and activities in the region as it had prior to
the ruling.

141. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

2019,

at

7–8

(2019),

https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-
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two pages of relatively detailed analysis to the ruling. This included a summary of the issues raised by the Philippines, a description of seven elements
of the ruling characterized as “significant,” an emphasis that “the ruling is
binding on China and the Philippines,” and a recounting of the post-ruling
interactions between the parties. 142 The 2017 report also observed, “China
has adjusted talking points to exclude references to the claimed ‘nine-dash
line,’ probably to avoid taking a position that directly opposes the ruling and
risks additional regional backlash.” 143 The 2018 report also discussed the tribunal’s ruling, but to a more limited extent. Of note, this report expressed
concern about some of China’s post-ruling statements suggesting that it
might draw “unlawful straight baselines around three other South China Sea
island groups.” 144 The discussion in the 2019 report was even shorter, composed of only three sentences. But the final words of the third sentence of
that brief passage is clear: “[T]he ruling is binding on China.” 145
While the U.S. government did not refer to the tribunal’s ruling on a
daily basis, senior officials and high-level documents consistently invoked
the ruling over the past four years. These recurring invocations included several common elements. First, they highlighted that the ruling deliberately did
not address the competing sovereignty claims but focused on addressing
maritime legal issues under the UNCLOS regime, including the legal status
of specific geographic features in the South China Sea. Second, they pointed
out that the ruling invalidated several of China’s maritime claims in the South
China Sea, including China’s nine-dashed line claim, its claim to historic
rights, and its claims to maritime entitlements for submerged features and
artificial islands. Third, they described how the ruling determined that China,
which does not satisfy the UNCLOS definition of archipelagic State, may
not draw straight baselines around offshore island groups or claim internal
waters therein. Fourth, they emphasized that the ruling is final and legally
1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf [hereinafter 2019 ANNUAL RE-

PORT TO CONGRESS]

In July 2016, a tribunal established pursuant to the Law of the Sea Convention ruled that
China’s claims to `historic rights’ over the South China Sea encompassed by the `nine-dash
line’ could not exceed its maritime rights under the Law of the Sea Convention. China did
not participate in the arbitration and Chinese officials publicly voiced opposition to the
ruling. By the terms of the Convention, the ruling is binding on China.

142. 2017 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 139, at 8, 9.
143. Id. at 9.
144. 2018 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 140, at 13.
145. 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 141, at 8.
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binding on China and the Philippines. Fifth, they criticized China for ignoring the ruling and extrapolated how that disregard demonstrated China’s
challenge to the rules-based international order. Sixth, they called upon both
parties to comply with the ruling and its specific elements. Taken together,
these invocations by senior officials and high-level documents demonstrated
that the United States had certainly not forgotten the tribunal’s ruling and
that it considered many of the ruling’s elements to reflect established international law.
B. U.S. Actions that Support the Ruling
In addition to the official U.S. statements and documents, the government
also engaged in specific actions, which should be considered when assessing
the U.S. perspective on the tribunal ruling’s value and viability. Under President Trump, the U.S. military enhanced its presence in the South China Sea
in several noteworthy ways to implement U.S. policy on the South China
Sea. Some of these ways appeared to be effectuating elements of the tribunal’s ruling.
First, the Trump administration streamlined the executive branch’s approval process for maritime operations conducted by U.S. military forces,
including those conducted in the South China Sea. Four decades ago, the
U.S. government established its Freedom of Navigation Program:
Since 1979, U.S. Presidents have directed the U.S. Government to carry
out a Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program to preserve this national
interest. The U.S. FON Program includes: (1) consultations and representations by U.S. diplomats (i.e., U.S. Department of State) and (2) operational assertions by U.S. military forces (i.e., U.S. Department of Defense
(DoD) FON Program). 146

Within the Department of Defense, the FON program includes both
“planned FON assertions” and “other FON-related activities.” 147 Planned
FON assertions, also known as freedom of navigation operations (FO146. U.S. Department of Defense, Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/DoD%20FON%20Program%20Summary%2016.
pdf?ver=2017-03-03-141350-380.
147. Id.
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NOPs), are defined as “operations that have the primary purpose of challenging excessive maritime claims.” 148 Other FON-related activities are defined as “operations that have some other primary purpose, but have a secondary effect of challenging excessive maritime claims.” 149 The operations
are described as “deliberately planned, legally reviewed, properly approved
and conducted with professionalism”; 150 however, this public document
does not specify who within the military chain of command has the authority
to approve operations.
President Obama’s administration was reportedly reluctant to approve
FONOPs in the South China Sea, or at least certain categories of those operations. For example, during a September 2015 hearing of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, Senator Sullivan questioned Admiral Harris,
who was serving as Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, about whether U.S.
military forces should conduct operations within 12 nautical miles of South
China Sea features that China had “built-up.” 151 In response, Admiral Harris
stated, “I believe that we should be allowed to exercise freedom of navigation and maritime and flight in the South China Sea against those islands that
are not islands.” 152 Senator Sullivan then asked, “Have you or [then-Secretary
of Defense Ash] Carter asked the White House for permission to do that?” 153
Harris responded, “Senator, I have given policy options—military options
to the Secretary and I would leave it to the Secretary or [Assistant Secretary
of Defense David Shear] to address.” 154 Senator Sullivan then redirected his
questioning to Shear, who was serving as the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Asia-Pacific Security Affairs and was testifying beside Admiral Harris at
the hearing. Sullivan asked, “What has the White House said when you have
asked permission to go within the 12-mile zone of a feature like that?” In
response, Shear stated, “Senator, [U.S. Pacific Command], along with the
Department of Defense, are options-generating institutions and the Secretary is particularly interested in options with regard to the South China Sea
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Hearing to Receive Testimony on Maritime Security Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region Before
the S. Comm. On Armed Services, 108th Cong. 53 (2015), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/15-72%20-%209-17-15a.pdf [hereinafter Hearing on Maritime Security Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region].
152. Id. at 54.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 55.
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in general.” 155 Sullivan rephrased his question: “But I just asked a simple
question. What did the White House say if you asked for permission to go
within inside the 12-mile limit? What did the White House say?” 156 Shear
responded, “Sir, I am not able to discuss current policy deliberations, but I
can assure you that that is one of the options that the administration is considering.” 157 This verbal exchange between Congress and senior leaders
within the Department of Defense implied that the approval authority for
these FONOPs was retained at the White House level during the Obama
administration. Additionally, Assistant Secretary Shear’s response strongly
suggested that the White House was reluctant to approve such operations in
the South China Sea.
Two years later, President Trump had taken office. At the confirmation
hearing for General Joseph Dunford, U.S. Marine Corps, for reappointment
as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the same Senator Sullivan asked,
“Can you elaborate a bit on the [Department of Defense’s] FONOPs policy
and if this differs from the previous administration?” 158 In response, General
Dunford described the difference as follows:
Secretary [of Defense James] Mattis, when he came in, in early February
[2017], we went to him with a couple of individual Freedom of Navigation
Operations that you spoke about. And he said, `Hey, look, I—how about
giving me a full strategy that lays this thing out now for a long period of
time and talks about the strategic effect we're trying to achieve?’ You spoke
about partners, you talk about being routine and regular. And so, those are
the things that Secretary Mattis directed. After that, Admiral Harris developed a long-term plan for Freedom of Navigation Operations and that's
what we're implementing right now, is a strategic approach to Freedom of
Navigation Operations that does, in fact, support our overall strategy in
the Pacific, as well as the specific mission, which is to ensure that we fly,
sail and operate wherever international law allows. And we continue to validate those claims where we see international airspace, for that matter, or
the maritime domain. 159
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Hearing to Consider the Nomination of General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., USMC, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and Reappointment to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Before
the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 115th Cong. 91 (2017), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/17-80_09-26-17.pdf.
159. Id. at 92.
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Senator Sullivan then asked a follow-up question, “So, those are going well,
regular, routine, with our allies, if possible, not micromanaged from the [National Security Council at the White House]?” 160 General Dunford confirmed, “That's right. And, Senator, in candor, we still and always will, take
into account what else is happening in the strategic environment.” 161 By
streamlining the approval process for FONOPs, the Trump administration
validated the importance of regularly conducting these operations in the
South China Sea to uphold the rule of law.
Second, the U.S. military now conducts FONOPs in the South China
Sea more frequently than it did in the past. One of the challenges in identifying trends in the rate of FONOPs is the limited public information about
those operations. For decades, the Department of Defense has published
annual reports containing information about freedom of navigation operations. But for 2016 and prior years, the annual reports included only two
elements of information: (1) the claimant State whose claim had been challenged by the FONOP and (2) the category of the excessive maritime claim
that had been challenged. 162 Due to a requirement in the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, however, annual FON reports for 2017 through
2021 now include a third element of information: “[t]he nature of each claim,
including the geographic location or area covered by such claim (including
the body of water and island grouping, when applicable).” 163 But this additional information still does not provide the full clarity necessary to perform
external analysis about whether the frequency of FONOPs are increasing or
decreasing, particularly in the South China Sea.
However, other public data sources strongly suggest the frequency of its
FONOPs in the South China Sea increased under President Trump. Dr. Collin Koh, a Singaporean scholar who studies maritime security in East Asia,
has developed, maintains, and distributes an unofficial chart that lists each
FONOP conducted in the South China Sea. Dr. Koh’s compilation is based
160. Id.
161. Id. at 93.
162. See U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Freedom of Navigation (FON) Reports,
https://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Offices/FON/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2021) [hereinafter
Annual FON Reports] (provides a record of operational assertions for fiscal years 1991–
2019).
163. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, §
1275(b)(2), 130 Stat. 2000, 2540 (2016).
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upon reporting published by various news organizations and press releases
issued by national governments. Published in late May 2020, Dr. Koh’s most
recent chart summarizing individual operations contained information that
can be aggregated to show the unofficial total numbers of FONOPs for each
of the past four and a half years: three during the Obama administration’s
last year in office (2016), four during the Trump administration’s first year
in office (2017), six in the second year (2018), eight in the third year (2019)
and ten in the fourth year (2020). 164
The trending numbers of FONOPs in the South China Sea might actually be even greater, according to a news article published in February 2020,
reportedly based upon data provided by U.S. Pacific Fleet. 165 This increased
level of operational activity evidences that the United States does, in fact, fly,
sail, and operate wherever international law allows, including in the South
China Sea.
Third, during the Trump administration, the U.S. military made deliberate efforts to work cooperatively with its allies and partners to preserve maritime freedom in the waters of East Asia, including the South China Sea. Like
prior presidents, such as Ronald Reagan, 166 President Trump and his administration emphasized the importance of preserving “peace through strength”
in protecting U.S. national security interests. 167 But Trump slightly refined
this longstanding strategic principle through the lens of his “America First”
164. Collin Koh (@CollinSLKoh), TWITTER (Dec. 24, 2020, 9:51 PM), https://twitter.com/CollinSLKoh/status/1342211239796068354/photo/1.
165. David B. Larter, In Challenging China’s Claims in the South China Sea, the US Navy Is
Getting More Assertive, DEFENSE NEWS (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/02/05/in-challenging-chinas-claims-in-the-south-china-sea-the-us-navy-is-getting-more-assertive/
The U.S. Navy conducted more freedom of navigation operations in 2019 than in any year
since the U.S. began more aggressively challenging China’s claims in the South China Sea
in 2015. The Navy conducted nine FONOPs in the South China Sea last year, according to
records provided by U.S. Pacific Fleet.

166. See, e.g., Republican Party Platform of 1980, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT
(July 15, 1980), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform1980 (“Republicans support a policy of peace through strength; weakness provokes aggression.”) Reagan was first elected as president in the 1980 election.
167. President Ronald Reagan, Speech at the Republican National Convention: Peace
Through Strength (July 17, 1980), https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/permanent-exhibits/peace-through-strength.
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policy, 168 particularly concerning the U.S. global network of treaty alliances.
In Trump’s National Security Strategy, he stated, “Allies and partners magnify
our power. We expect them to shoulder a fair share of the burden of responsibility to protect against common threats.” 169 He emphasized, “Together
with our allies, partners and aspiring partners, the United States will pursue
cooperation with reciprocity. Cooperation means sharing responsibilities
and burdens.” 170 In the context of preserving maritime freedom globally, the
Trump administration arguably wanted to ensure that U.S. allies and partners
were not “free riders” 171 in preserving freedom of navigation.
In fact, during the Trump administration, the United States emphasized
collective efforts to preserve maritime freedom in the South China Sea. During one of the Senate hearings mentioned previously, Assistant Secretary of
State Stilwell testified, “We work with Indo-Pacific allies and partners to
conduct joint maritime training and operations to maintain free and open
access and we have welcomed historic firsts in that regard.” 172 One such
“first” occurred in May 2019, when U.S. military forces conducted their first
“joint sail” through the South China Sea with military ships and aircraft of
India, Japan, and the Philippines. 173 In April 2020, three U.S. Navy ships
conducted combined operations in the South China Sea with HMAS Parramatta, a Royal Australian Navy frigate. 174 The U.S. Navy admiral who participated in these combined U.S.-Australian operations stated, “To bring this
much combat capability together here in the South China Sea truly signals to
our allies and partners in the region that we are deeply committed to a free
and open Indo-Pacific.” 175 About those same combined operations, the
commanding officer of one of the participating U.S. Navy ships stated,
168. Of note, the last sentence immediately above President Trump’s signature declares: “This National Security Strategy puts America First.” 2017 NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY, supra note 87, at ii.
169. Id. at 4.
170. Id.
171. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
172. Stilwell Statement, supra note 118, at 117.
173. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC: ADVANCING A
SHARED VISION 23 (2019), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Freeand-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf.
174. Nicholas Huynn, U.S. Navy, Royal Australian Navy Team Up in the South China Sea,
CPF (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/130600.
175. Id.
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“They (Australia) have the same interest in ensuring freedom of navigation
and observance of internationally accepted norms and customs pertaining to
the law of the sea.” 176
As for future intentions of collective efforts to preserve maritime freedom in the South China Sea, the United Kingdom is reportedly planning to
deploy its newest aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth in 2021 for combined
operations with the U.S. Navy. 177 The British newspaper that reported this
planned deployment assessed,
The US is seeking to increase its military presence in the South China Sea in
a bid to counteract Chinese attempts at hegemony and to assert the right to
freedom of navigation in the sea. The Queen Elizabeth’s participation in the
forthcoming naval mission will help reinforce the notion that the UK supports US foreign policy. 178

In short, these combined, burden-sharing operations appear to have been
intended to message that preserving maritime freedom is a “shared” interest
in advancing a “free and open” Indo-Pacific region, including in the South
China Sea.
Fourth and perhaps most significantly, the U.S. military during the
Trump administration conducted a category of FONOPs in the South China
Sea that appeared deliberately intended to further an element of the arbitral
tribunal’s ruling. During the Obama administration and before the tribunal’s
ruling, the U.S. military either was not conducting—or was rarely conducting—FONOPs in the South China Sea within twelve miles of geographic
features that China had built up. During the September 2015 hearing of the
Senate Armed Services Committee discussed previously, Senator John
McCain, the committee chairman, sparred with Ambassador Shear on this
precise issue. When questioned, Ambassador Shear acknowledged that U.S.
forces had not conducted a FONOP within 12 nautical miles of the artificial
176. Peter Mitchell, US Praises Aust Warship in South China Sea, CANBERRA TIMES (Apr.
27, 2020), https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/6735768/us-praises-aust-warship-insouth-china-sea/.
177. John Varga, South China Sea Shock: How UK Will Team Up with US and Dutch in Bold
Mission in 2021, EXPRESS (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.express.co.uk/news/
world/1197401/south-china-sea-news-hms-queen-elizabeth-us-navy-vietnam-nine-dashline-world-war-3.
178. Id.
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islands for three years. 179 After the tribunal’s ruling, however, the Department of Defense reported that U.S. military forces conducted FONOPs in
2017 and 2018 to challenge a new category of excessive maritime claim by
China: “actions/statements that indicate a claim to a [territorial sea] around
features not so entitled.” 180 Notably, this fourth distinction of FONOPs under the Trump administration operationalized two specific determinations
in the arbitration ruling: (1) that low-tide elevations in the South China Sea,
such as Mischief Reef, occupied by China “do not generate entitlements to
a territorial sea” of their own 181; and (2) “[a] low-tide elevation will remain a
low-tide elevation under [UNCLOS], regardless of the scale of the island or
installation built atop it.” 182 Such operational actions also demonstrated the
ruling’s continued relevance to the United States.
C. U.S. Silence and Inaction
The United States undertook the above-discussed actions in furtherance of
its South China Sea policy and certain elements of the arbitral tribunal’s ruling. But sometimes, it is not only what a government says and does that is
important, but also what it does not say and what it does not do that can be
equally relevant. In the context of the South China Sea arbitration ruling, it
appears that the United States has made no official statements nor taken any
noticeable actions in furtherance of one particular element of that ruling.
179. Hearing on Maritime Security Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region, supra note 151, at 22
Chairman McCain: Have we gone within the 12 miles of the reclaimed area? The answer I
believe is no.
Ambassador Shear: We have not recently gone within 12 miles of a reclaimed area. However
---Chairman McCain: When was the last time we did?
Ambassador Shear: I believe the last time we conducted a freedom of navigation operation
in the South China Sea was April of this year.
Chairman McCain: Within the 12-mile limit. Come on, Mr. Secretary. I am very interested
in the 12-mile limit because if you respect the 12-mile limit, then that is de facto sovereignty
agreed to tacitly to the Chinese. Now, have we or have we not operated within the 12-mile
limit in recent years?
Ambassador Shear: I believe the last time we conducted a freedom of navigation operation
within 12 nautical miles of one of those features was 2012.
Chairman McCain: 2012, 3 years ago.

180. Annual FON Reports, supra note 162.
181. South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 1203.
182. Id. ¶ 305.
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More specifically, it has remained silent about the tribunal’s legal analysis of
what geographic features are entitled to an EEZ and its resulting determinations that none of the high-tide elevations highlighted in the Philippines arbitration pleadings are so entitled.
Under the legal regime reflected in UNCLOS, a coastal State may claim
an EEZ, within which it has resource-related sovereign rights and jurisdiction. 183 The EEZ shall not extend more than 200 nautical miles from the
State’s coastline, 184 or less if other nearby State or States are also entitled to
an EEZ. 185 The coastlines from which a State can derive its EEZ can include
the State’s mainland coast and certain land features. These features must be
“naturally formed areas of land, surrounded above water at high tide”; 186 in
other words, “artificial islands” are not entitled to a territorial sea or an EEZ
of their own. 187 Coastal States may claim an EEZ for islands that can “sustain
human habitation or economic life of their own,” 188 but a feature that cannot
human habitation or economic life is a “rock,” which is entitled to a territorial sea but not an EEZ. 189
As discussed above, 190 the tribunal rendered sixty-five specific findings
and declarations. Most of the issues and corresponding rulings have already
been examined in this article. Many of these particular elements of the ruling
have been expressly invoked by the U.S. government over the past four
years. The curious question worth asking then is why none of the statements
about the tribunal’s ruling have made either an express or an implied reference to the tribunal’s analysis and application of Article 121(3) to specific
South China Sea features.
Part of the reason for this noticeable silence might be the potential legal
ramifications of this element of the tribunal’s ruling if it were applied universally, including to several U.S. islands remotely located in the Pacific
Ocean. In addition to the highly-populated Hawaiian Islands, Guam, and
American Samoa, the United States has sovereignty over eight smaller islands
in the Pacific: Baker Island, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll,
183. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 56.
184. Id. art. 57.
185. Id. art. 74(1).
186. Id. art. 121(1).
187. Id. art. 60(8).
188. Id. art. 121(3).
189. Id.
190. See supra Part II.A.
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Kingman Reef, Midway Atoll, Palmyra Atoll and Wake Island. 191 Under the
Guano Act of 1856, 192 the United States asserted sovereignty over most of
these islands. 193 Since 1983, the United States has also claimed a 200 nautical
mile EEZ around each 194 even though most are uninhabited. 195 In the words
of UNCLOS, can these islands “sustain human habitation or economic life
of their own”? When analyzed under some of the factors enunciated by the
arbitral tribunal, the facts are not entirely clear.
Consider their historical usage. In the South China Sea arbitration, the
arbitral tribunal assessed, “[T]he most reliable evidence of the capacity of a
feature will usually be the historical use to which it has been put.” 196 In
greater detail, the tribunal explained:
If the historical record of a feature indicates that nothing resembling a stable community has ever developed there, the most reasonable conclusion
would be that the natural conditions are simply too difficult for such a
community to form and that the feature is not capable of sustaining such
habitation. . . . In the absence of . . . intervening forces [such as war, pollution, and environmental harm], the Tribunal can reasonably conclude that
a feature that has never historically sustained a human community lacks the
capacity to sustain human habitation. 197

Of note, the tribunal clarified that “a purely official or military population,
serviced from the outside, does not constitute evidence that a feature is capable of sustaining human habitation.” 198
191. See U.S. Pacific Remote Island Area (PRIA), NOAA, https://www.coris.noaa.gov/portals/pria.html#:~:text=The%20U.S.%20Pacific%20Remote%20Island,Hawai'i%20and%20American%20Samoa (last visited Jan. 6, 2021).
192. An Act to Authorize Protection to be Given to Citizens of the United States who
May Discover Deposits of Guano, 11 Stat. 164 (1856).
193. U.S. Pacific Remote Island Area (PRIA), supra note 191.
194. Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States, Proclamation No.5030, 48 Fed.
Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983); see also U.S. Department of State, Exclusive Economic Zone
and Maritime Boundaries, Notice of Limits, Public Notice 2237, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,825 (Aug.
23, 1995.
195. U.S. Pacific Remote Island Area (PRIA), supra note 191.
196. South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 549.
197. Id.
198. Id. ¶ 550.
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What is the evidence about “community” and “historical use” on these
remote U.S. islands by humans other than “a purely official or military population”? Perhaps the best evidence is what the U.S. government says about
them. For example, there has been an extremely limited presence of humans
on Howland, Baker, and Jarvis Islands:
Although Polynesians were likely the first visitors to these islands, westerners “rediscovered” them in an uninhabited state in the early 1820s. Claimed
by the United States in 1856 under the Guano Act, colonists helping to
consolidate the U.S. claim to the islands [when they] constructed settlements and lived there from 1935 until they were rescued in 1942 after being
attacked several times at the onset of World War II. 199

U.S. government documents describe Palmyra Atoll as “host[ing] a 6,000man Naval Air Station in World War II, complete with dock and airfield,”
and Wake Island as “[u]sed by early Marshall Island navigators and later by
a cable station and Pan American Airways, the atoll has been primarily used
by the U.S. military since before World War II.” 200 In summary, the United
States had only a limited presence on “[t]hese small dots of land in the midst
of the ocean”: 201
During World War II, the U.S. constructed and occupied military bases at
Johnston and Palmyra Atolls, Wake Island, Midway Atoll and Baker Island.
Jarvis and Howland Islands were also briefly occupied or utilized during
the war. With the closure of the military base at Johnston Atoll in 2004,
only Wake Island remains an active U.S. military base. 202

The last U.S. military personnel stationed on Midway Atoll departed in
1997. 203 The U.S. government describes these islands’ current capabilities as
follows: “Only Midway and Palmyra Atolls have serviceable runways; Baker
199. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monument,
https://www.fws.gov/uploadedFiles/Region_1/NWRS/Zone_1/Pacific_Reefs_Complex/Johnston_Atoll/Documents/PRIMNM%20brief(2).pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2021)
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. U.S. Pacific Remote Island Area (PRIA), supra note 191.
203. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Midway Atoll National Wildlife Refuge and Battle of Midway National Memorial, Chronology of Events, https://www.fws.gov/refuge/Midway_Atoll/preserving_the_past/Chronology_of_Events.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2021).
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Island, Howland Island and Johnston Atoll no longer have functional airstrips.” 204 Midway Atoll is described as “one of the most remote coral atolls
on earth.” 205 The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service’s solicitation for “biological
volunteers” to work for six-month periods at the National Wildlife Refuge
on Johnston Atoll states, “[T]he remote location and isolation of Johnston
Atoll and other Pacific island refuges make it virtually impossible for the
general public to visit.” 206
Consider these islands’ size, especially compared to the eleven geographic high-tide features analyzed by the arbitral tribunal. The tribunal calculated the size of each of these features. 207 It described Itu Aba as “the
largest high-tide feature in the Spratly Islands” and calculated its size to be
approximately 1.4 kilometers in length and 400 meters at its widest point,
and have a total surface area of 0.43 square kilometers. 208
What about the size of the U.S. remote islands in the Pacific? The CIA’s
World Factbook lists the “emergent land” area for each of these islands as
follows: Baker Island (2.1 square kilometers), Howland Island (2.6 square
kilometers), Jarvis Island (5 square kilometers), Johnston Atoll (2.6 square
kilometers), Kingman Reef (0.01 square kilometers), Midway Islands (6.2
square kilometers) and Palmyra Atoll (3.9 square kilometers). 209 Thus, except
for Kingman Reef, all of these islands are geographically larger than the largest South China Sea feature analyzed by the tribunal. Yet the tribunal in the
South China Sea arbitration concluded that “size cannot be a dispositive of
a feature’s status as a fully entitled island or rock and is not, on its own, a
relevant factor” under Article 121(3). 210
204. U.S. Pacific Remote Island Area (PRIA), supra note 191.
205. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Midway Atoll National Wildlife Refuge and Battle of Midway National Memorial, More About Midway, https://www.fws.gov/refuge/Midway_Atoll/more_about_midway.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2021).
206. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Johnston Atoll, https://www.fws.gov/refuge/Johnston_Atoll/what_we_do/get_involved.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2021).
207. South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 401.
208. Id.
209. United States Pacific Island Wildlife Refuges, THE WORLD FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/history.html
(last
visited Jan. 6, 2021).
210. South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 538
The Tribunal considers that the travaux make clear that—although size may correlate to the
availability of water, food, living space and resources for an economic life—size cannot be
dispositive of a feature’s status as a fully entitled island or rock and is not, on its own, a
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Consider the remote nature of these islands. The tribunal implied that
remoteness of a geographic feature did not ipso facto render the feature to be
a rock, particularly if there was a “stable community” of “human habitation.” 211 But in concluding that Scarborough Shoal was not a fully entitled
island, the tribunal found that its high-tide elevations “could not sustain human habitation in their naturally formed state; they have no fresh water, vegetation, or living space and are remote from any feature possessing such features.” 212
What is the proximity of the U.S. islands to other inhabited islands?
Baker Island is 3,390 kilometers southwest of Honolulu, about halfway between Hawaii and Australia; Howland Island is 3,360 kilometers southwest
of Honolulu, about halfway between Hawaii and Australia; Jarvis Island is
2,415 kilometers south of Honolulu, about halfway between Hawaii and the
Cook Islands; Johnston Atoll is 1,330 kilometers southwest of Honolulu,
about one-third of the way from Hawaii to the Marshall Islands; Kingman
Reef is 1,720 kilometers south of Honolulu, about halfway between Hawaii
and American Samoa; Midway Islands is 2,335 kilometers northwest of Honolulu near the end of the Hawaiian Archipelago, about one-third of the way
from Honolulu to Tokyo; and Palmyra Atoll is 1,780 kilometers south of
Honolulu, about halfway between Hawaii and American Samoa. 213
Consider the terrain of these islands. In the South China Sea arbitration,
the arbitral tribunal opined, “evidence of physical conditions will ordinarily
suffice only to classify features that clearly fall within one category or the
other.” 214 What are the physical conditions of the U.S. islands? The World
relevant factor. As noted by the International Court of Justice in Territorial and Maritime
Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), “international law does not prescribe any minimum size
which a feature must possess in order to be considered an island.”

211. Id. ¶ 542
The term “human habitation” should be understood to involve the inhabitation of the feature by a stable community of people for whom the feature constitutes a home and on
which they can remain. Such a community need not necessarily be large and in remote atolls
a few individuals or family groups could well suffice.

212. Id. ¶ 556 (emphasis added).
213. United States Pacific Island Wildlife Refuges, supra note 209.
214. South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 548
[I]n light of the Tribunal’s conclusions on the interpretation of Article 121(3), evidence of
the objective, physical conditions on a particular feature can only take the Tribunal so far in
its task. In the Tribunal’s view, evidence of physical conditions will ordinarily suffice only to
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Factbook also includes a collection of satellite, aerial, and ground-level photographic imagery of Baker Island, 215 Howland Island, 216 Jarvis Island, 217
classify features that clearly fall within one category or the other. If a feature is entirely barren
of vegetation and lacks drinkable water and the foodstuffs necessary even for basic survival,
it will be apparent that it also lacks the capacity to sustain human habitation. The opposite
conclusion could likewise be reached where the physical characteristics of a large feature
make it definitively habitable. The Tribunal considers, however, that evidence of physical
conditions is insufficient for features that fall close to the line. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to determine from the physical characteristics of a feature alone where the capacity
merely to keep people alive ends and the capacity to sustain settled habitation by a human
community begins. This will particularly be the case as the relevant threshold may differ from
one feature to another.

215. Satellite Image of Baker Island, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/images/large/UM_001_large.JPG?1528325549;
Aerial Image of Baker Island, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/attachments/images/large/Baker_isle_a320.gif?1582570825; Ground-level Image of Baker Island, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/attachments/images/large/Baker_day_beacon.jpg?1582644257 (all last visited
Jan. 6, 2021).
216. Satellite Image of Howland Island, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/images/large/UM_006_large.jpg?1528325549;
Ground-level Images of Howland Island, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/images/large/Howland_sign-CNewton.jpg?
1583945584; https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/
images/large/Howland_Island_coastline.jpg?1582738650 (all last visited Jan. 6, 2021).
217. Satellite images of Jarvis Island, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/images/large/UM_007_large.jpg?1528325550;
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/images/
large/UM_004_large.jpg?1528325550; Ground-level Image of Jarvis Island, CIA,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/images/
large/Jarvis_Island_Guano_Tramway.jpg?1583844180 (both last visited Jan. 6, 2021).
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Johnston Atoll, 218 Kingman Reef, 219 Midway Atoll 220 and Palmyra Atoll. 221
Many of these features appear to be composed of physical conditions similar
to the islands at issue in the South China Sea. About Kingman Reef, The
World Factbook states: “The east-west and northwest-southeast trending small
strips of dry land (gray color) are composed of coral rubble and giant clamshells. The highest point on the reef is less than 1.5 m (5 ft.) above sea level,
which is awash most of the time, making Kingman Reef a maritime hazard.” 222 More generally, if one reviews these publicly-available photographic
images for each of the islands, they could reasonably conclude that, with the
possible exception of Midway Atoll, none of these remote islands appear to
be “capable of human habitation or economic life.”
Given that a coastal State has exclusive sovereign rights and jurisdiction
to natural resources (e.g., fisheries, oil, natural gas, and seabed minerals) lo218. Satellite image of Johnston Atoll, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/images/large/UM_002_large.png?1528325551;
Ground-level image of Johnston Atoll, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/images/large/Johnston_Island_male_frigate_birds.jpg?1583418808 (both last visited Jan. 6, 2021).
219. Satellite Images of Kingman Reef, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/images/large/UM_003_large.jpg?1528325552;
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/images/
large/Kingman_Reef_-_2014-02-18_-_Landsat_8_-_15m.png?1583751946; Aerial Image
of Kingman Reef, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/images/large/Kingman_Reef_NWR._Photo_credit-_Susan_White-USFWS_
%2812198955306%29.jpg?1583751575; Ground-level Image of Kingman Reef, CIA,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/images/large/Kingman_reef_wreck.jpg?1583772213 (all last visited Jan. 6, 2021).
220. Satellite Image of Midway Atoll, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/images/large/UM_005_large.JPG?1528325553;
Ground-level Image of Midway Atoll, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/attachments/images/large/Midway_barracks3.jpg?1583950723 (both last
visited Jan. 6, 2021).
221. Satellite Images of Palmyra Atoll, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/images/large/UM_009_large.JPG?1528325554,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/images/large/UM_008_large.png?1528325555; Aerial Image of Palmyra Atoll, CIA,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/images/large/Palmyra_Atoll_NWR_aerial_FWS.jpg?1583770797; Ground-level Image of
Palmyra Atoll, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/images/large/Palmyra_shoreline.jpg?1583764495 (all last visited Jan. 6, 2021).
222. United States Pacific Island Wildlife Refuges, supra note 209.
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cated within its EEZ, it can draw significant benefits from an EEZ surrounding one or more small remote islands. In practical terms, a basic mathematical calculation shows that such an island could yield an EEZ of approximately 430,000 square kilometers. 223 Almost all of the eight remote U.S.
islands in the Pacific Ocean are beyond the EEZ of any other U.S. island.
Through an aggregation of the EEZs claimed by the United States for these
islands, one can quickly see how the United States claims the largest EEZ in
the world. 224 But what is mathematical and what is lawful are not necessarily
synonymous. The question is whether each of these islands is legally entitled
to an EEZ. When considered together, the available evidence regarding the
historical use, geographic size, remote nature, and physical conditions of
these islands strongly suggest that the U.S. claim to an EEZ for some or all
of them is questionable.
Return now to the context of the United States potentially advocating
for the viability of this element of the tribunal’s ruling. If the United States
were to highlight the lengthy portion of the arbitral tribunal’s ruling that interprets, analyzes, and applies Article 121(3) and concludes that none of the
South China Sea features are entitled to an EEZ, then the United States
could be accused of following a double-standard in not applying this rule to
its remote islands in the Pacific Ocean.
V.

CONCLUSION

A perennial issue of public international law is its enforceability. Given that
the international rules-based order is primarily an anarchical system, 225 there
are limited ways in which the rules underlying the international order can be
223. Notionally, the geographic area of a small island would be at least 429,463 square
kilometers, based upon the following mathematical calculation of the difference between
the total geographic area of a 200 nautical mile radius circle (or 370 kilometer radius circle)
and the total geographic area of a 12 nautical mile radius circle (or 22.22 kilometer radius
circle).
224. The United States Is An Ocean Nation, NOAA, https://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/2011/012711_gcil_maritime_eez_map.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2021) (“The U.S.
EEZ is the largest in the world, spanning over 13,000 miles of coastline and containing 3.4
million square nautical miles of ocean—larger than the combined land area of all fifty
states.”).
225. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS (1977).
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enforced against individual States. This is especially true for decisions rendered by international courts and tribunals, including those of the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
and arbitral tribunals such as those constituted under UNCLOS. Unlike domestic justice systems, these international courts and tribunals lack the equivalent of an auxiliary police force to ensure that those appearing before them
comply with their “binding” judicial rulings. Complicating matters further is
that international courts and tribunals’ decisions are legally binding only
upon the State parties to that case. 226
Given these structural challenges of international justice generally and
China’s repeated failure to abide by the tribunal’s ruling in the South China
Sea arbitration, what is the rest of the international community left to do?
First, any sovereign State can “call upon” or “name and shame” any other
sovereign State to comply with its legal obligations under international law,
including decisions by international courts and tribunals that are legally binding upon that State. However, nothing prevents that other State from ignoring those diplomatic exhortations, especially if its government cares more
about its domestic legitimacy than its international reputation. Similarly, a
group of States can collaborate and issue a joint exhortation, but the other
State could ignore that chorus of diplomatic voices as well. A State can employ economic measures, including imposing economic sanctions or offering
economic incentives to persuade another State to comply with its legal obligations. However, the other State might have sufficient independent economic power to withstand external sanctions or incentives, thereby rending
them ineffective. In the direst circumstances, a State or States use military
force to bring another State into compliance with its obligations. However,
in the post-World War II international system, such uses of force generally
require either conditions triggering the right of individual or collective selfdefense 227 or a specific authorization by the U.N. Security Council. 228 When
226. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 59, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (“The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the
parties and in respect of that particular case.”); see also UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 296(2)
(“Any such decision shall have no binding force except between the parties and in respect
of that particular dispute.”). Of course, nothing prevents those international courts and tribunals from citing previous judicial decisions in subsequent cases as persuasive authority
for rendering decisions that are consistent with those previous decisions, which is a common practice among these courts and tribunals.
227. U.N. Charter art. 51.
228. Id. art. 41.
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the other State is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the veto power 229 all but ensures that the Council will not authorize the
use of force. In short, a third-party State’s employment of diplomatic, economic, and military power might be unavailable or ineffective to bring a particular State into compliance with its obligations under international law.
In the context of the tribunal’s ruling in the South China Sea arbitration
and the importance of ensuring this ruling is followed by the two party-States
to the arbitration, a third-party State has a calculated decision to make. Exactly how important is this judicial ruling? If a third-party State determines
the ruling is critical to its national interests, in that case, it should expend
greater resources and political efforts to ensure that the State-parties comply
with the ruling. On the other hand, if a third-party State assesses the tribunal’s ruling to be merely helpful or of mixed value, that State will likely do
nothing more than issue public statements supporting the ruling. Of course,
different States have different interests and weigh their interests differently;
thus, they may reach different determinations.
The United States has a significant incentive to ensure that the tribunal’s
ruling is followed. Politically, the United States was a leader in the construction and development of the post-World War II international order and system, a system designed first and foremost to ensure that a third world war
never happened. 230 The arbitral tribunal’s ruling embodies the first of the
four stated purposes of the United Nations:
To maintain international peace and security and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of
the peace and to bring about by peaceful means and in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace. 231

Moreover, the United States was instrumental in the ten years of negotiations
that resulted in UNCLOS. As an influential member of the U.S. delegation
to the UNCLOS conference testified at a Senate hearing, “[T]he Law of the
229. Id. art. 27(1).
230. Id. pmbl. (“We the Peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorry
to mankind.”).
231. Id. art. 1(1).
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Sea negotiations were a long-term bipartisan effort to further American interests that engaged high level attention in successive administrations and
among distinguished Members of both Houses of Congress.” 232 He further
testified: “The Law of the Sea Convention is in large measure the product of
American efforts. The United States succeeded in creating a firm, globally
accepted basis for long-term order and predictability at sea whose provisions, in President Reagan’s words, ‘fairly balance the interests of all
states.’” 233
However, when UNCLOS negotiations concluded in 1982, President
Reagan decided that the United States would not join the treaty, primarily
due to its problematic provisions regarding deep seabed mining. 234 But these
problems were corrected through a second implementation agreement, 235
which the United States was also instrumental in negotiating under the administrations of Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton. 236 Consequently, President Clinton submitted the 1982 treaty and the 1994 agreement
to the Senate for its constitutional advice and consent. Thereafter, three successive presidential administrations of both political parties advocated for
U.S. accession to the treaty. But the Senate has never taken a final vote on
accession due to significant opposition among Republican members of the
Senate. Ironically, some of these same Senate opponents of accession have
232. The United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 98th Cong. 92–93 (2007) (statement of Professor Bernard H. Oxman, Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/092707_100407_Transcript_The United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea2.pdf [hereinafter Oxman Statement].
233. Id. at 93.
234. Statement by the President, United States Oceans Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 383 (Mar. 10, 1983)
Last July I announced that the United States will not sign the United Nations Law of the
Sea Convention that was opened for signature on December 10. We have taken this step
because several major problems in the Convention’s deep seabed mining provisions are
contrary to the interests and principles of industrialized nations and would not attain the
aspirations of developing countries.

235. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 3.
236. Oxman Statement, supra note 232, at 93.
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introduced congressional legislation 237 and made public statements 238 over
the past four and half years that favorably invoke the arbitral tribunal’s ruling
and criticize China’s disregard of it.
From a policy perspective, the tribunal’s ruling is consistent with
longstanding tenets of U.S. regional foreign policy. Recall that the United
States has declared it has the following national interests in the South China
Sea: maintaining regional stability, upholding respect for international law,
preserving maritime freedom and promoting peaceful resolution of disputes.
As explained in this article, each of these interests is advanced by the tribunal’s ruling.
Procedurally, the arbitration proceedings and the tribunal’s ruling provide both claimant and non-claimant States a valuable opportunity to resolve
a number of the difficult legal issues affecting the South China Sea situation.
Five intellectual experts in the field of international law of the sea were called
upon to devote three and half years to analyzing these difficult issues. As of
the date of the ruling, four of these individuals had a combined total of fiftyfour years of prior judicial experience serving as members of the UNCLOScreated International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, while the fifth was a
recognized international scholar. Together, these imminent legal minds considered thousands of pages of evidence. They issued two comprehensive judicial rulings: a 159-page award analyzing and addressing procedural matters
and a 501-page award analyzing and addressing substantive legal issues affecting various aspects of the South China Sea situation. The tribunal deliberately avoided issues outside of its jurisdiction, such as the sovereignty disputes, instead focusing on issues that required interpreting and applying UNCLOS provisions. Given that other international institution, such as the
U.N. Security Council, U.N. General Assembly, International Court of Justice, and International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, are unlikely to be
called upon to analyze and address any of these legal issues involving the
South China Sea, the arbitral tribunal’s work product is likely to be one of
237. See, e.g., Resolution Calling for All Parties to Respect the Arbitral Tribunal Ruling
with Regard to the South China Sea and to Express United States Policy on Freedom of
Navigation and Overflight in the East and South China Seas, S. Res. 526, 114th Cong.
(2016), https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/sres526/BILLS-114sres526is.pdf; see also
South China Sea and East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2019, S. 1634, 116th Cong. (2019),
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1634/BILLS-116s1634is.pdf.
238. See, e.g., U.S. Senator Bob Corker, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Statement on Ruling in South China Sea Maritime Dispute (July 12, 2016), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/corker-statement-on-ruling-in-south-china-sea-maritime-dispute.
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the only independent efforts to provide a legal way forward on so many of
the South China Sea regions vexing issues.
If so much is at stake for the United States politically, substantively and
procedurally for ensuring that the tribunal’s ruling is fully valued and viable,
then what can and should the United States do to preserve that value and
ensure that viability? First and foremost, it should never presume that deliberate silence about the tribunal’s ruling will create “strategic space” for the
parties to make decisions and develop a way ahead. To the contrary, China
has proven in its international relations that it interprets silence by other
States as consent or, in the parlance of international law, acquiescence.
Therefore, the U.S. government should invoke the tribunal’s ruling repeatedly and consistently at all appropriate opportunities—both in meetings between senior U.S. officials and their counterparts from other States (e.g.,
China, U.S. allies and partners, and others), and in public remarks to international audiences and the news media. As the constitutional and political
powers of the executive branch of the government transferred yet again in
2021 from President Trump to President Joseph Biden, the new chief executive and senior officials in the Biden administration should continue to
speak directly about the tribunal ruling and its international significance, insist that the two parties comply with their obligations under the ruling, and
encourage non-party States to voluntary adhere to the elements of the ruling.
Words are important, but words alone are insufficient. More can and should
be done.
Diplomatically, the United States should also consider what options are
available to preserve the ruling’s value and ensure its viability. Are there conditions or contingencies that the United States can attempt to place upon its
relationship with China? Are there elements of the U.S.-China relationship
that are more important to China than the United States that the United
States could withhold if China does not comply with its obligations under
the tribunal’s ruling? Given that there is already an increasing discussion
about whether the United States should or will decouple its economy from
China and several equities that the United States seeks to protect in such
decoupling, it is difficult to envision that upholding the tribunal’s ruling
could be elevated above other direct economic interests of the United States
in the Biden administration or any successor administrations. But U.S. diplomats should consider this option.
Operationally, the United States under President Trump made positive
steps to effectuate elements of the tribunal’s ruling. For example, the U.S.
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military conducted FONOPs deliberately designed to challenge a new category of excessive maritime claim by China and were carried out in a manner
consistent with the portions of the tribunal’s ruling addressing the lack of
maritime entitlements for artificial islands and human-modified islands. In
fact, during the week marking the four-year anniversary of the ruling, the
secretary of state issued a statement “aligning” U.S. policy with the tribunal’s
ruling, and FONOPs were conducted within 12 nautical miles of Cuarteron
Reef and Fiery Cross Reef, two high-tide elevations occupied by China in
the Spratlys. 239 Looking ahead, President Biden and his administration
should continue to utilize the U.S. military to conduct such operations and
should consider whether there are other elements of the tribunal’s ruling that
could be directly effectuated by FONOPs and other military presence activities.
Administratively, the United States should also examine how it acts as a
coastal State. In particular, the United States should reconsider the full range
of maritime entitlements it claims for its remote islands in the Pacific Ocean.
Given the evidence identified in this article questioning whether several of
these islands qualify for an EEZ, 240 the United States should reevaluate those
claims. For economic purposes, President Reagan asserted a 200 nautical
mile EEZ around these islands, thereby acquiring sovereign resource-related
rights for the United States in and below these waters. For environmental
purposes, President George W. Bush established a 50 nautical mile marine
national monument around them, 241 and President Obama increased that
designation to 200 nautical miles. 242 Both the original designation and the
expanded designation were based upon the U.S. claim to jurisdiction in its
EEZ. Regardless of whether the asserted U.S. interests around these islands
are economic, environmental, or a combination of the two, the fact is that
these actions by the United States encourage other States to take similar actions with regards to their small, remotely-located islands. Additionally, so
long as those designations remain in effect, an effort to criticize a South
China Sea claimant (particularly China) for claiming an EEZ around small
239. Ankit Panda, US Conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation Near China-Held Features in
Spratlys, THE DIPLOMAT (July 15, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/us-conductsfreedom-of-navigation-operation-near-china-held-features-in-spratlys/.
240. See supra Part IV.C.
241. Establishment of the Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monument, Proclamation No. 8336, 74 Fed. Reg. 1565 (Jan. 6, 2009).
242. Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monument Expansion, Proclamation No.
9173, Fed. Reg. 58,645 (Sept. 25, 2014).
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features in the South China Sea or encourage any of the claimants to reduce
the size of their claimed maritime entitlements for small islands will likely be
ignored, and the United States will be characterized as hypocritical.
Judicially, the United States needs to understand that it can be viewed
skeptically by other States when it advocates for the Philippines and China
to abide by the arbitral tribunal's decisions in the South China Sea arbitration.
This was particularly true for the Trump administration. Recall the administration’s decisions to terminate U.S. treaty obligations and block cases
brought by other States against the United States in the International Court
of Justice, 243 and its criticism of “baseless, politicized” claims and the ability
of “purported” international courts to bind the United States. 244 Such harsh
criticism is not too dissimilar from some of the rhetoric employed by senior
officials of China’s government when discussing the arbitral tribunal that
heard and adjudicated the South China Sea arbitration. 245
Looking ahead in the Biden administration, the United States should
carefully consider the ramifications to international systems of justice, including the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea, before broadly dismissing the legitimacy of such judicial
bodies. At a minimum, the United States should highlight historical evidence
in its favor to preempt criticisms of being hypocritical, to include the fact
that the United States has adjudicated more of its international disputes before the International Court of Justice than any other State. 246 In contrast,
China has never adjudicated a dispute before either the International Court
of Justice or International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, even though it
has continuously empaneled its judges on both for the past twenty-five
years. 247 These facts suggest that China lacks a certain level of credibility—
243. See supra Part III.A.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 71 and 72.
245. See, e.g., Zhenmin Press Conference, supra note 35 (“The arbitration case unilaterally initiated by the Philippines and the illegal arbitration by the ad hoc tribunal is a political
farce carefully orchestrated under the legal pretext. The so-called award is illegal, null and
void.”).
246. See Contentious Cases Organized by State, ICJ, https://www.icj-cij.org/en/cases-bycountry (last visited Jan. 6, 2021) (listing the United States as having twenty-five cases litigated in the history of the Court).
247. See All Members, ICJ, https://www.icj-cij.org/en/all-members (last visited Jan. 6,
2021); see also Members of the Tribunal Since 1996, ITLOS, https://www.itlos.org/the-tribunal/members-of-the-tribunal-since-1996.
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that is, these means of international justice are good enough for other States
but inexplicably not good enough for China.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the United States should become
a party to UNCLOS. Four days before President Trump’s inauguration, this
author published an opinion-editorial entitled “How Trump Can Make
America Navigate Again.” 248 This commentary identified six concrete steps
by which the Trump administration could effectively protect the U.S. interest in maritime freedom. Reviewing the four years of the Trump administration, one could assess that the United States took several of these recommended steps, including messaging that maritime freedom is a priority of
national security strategy and calling upon America’s allies to help protect
maritime freedom around the world. But these six recommendations also
included the following:
[President Trump] should prioritize America’s accession to the Law of the
Sea Convention, which codifies maritime freedom into international law.
This action item is critically important for reasons of national security, energy security and economic opportunity. As commander of U.S. Central
Command, then General Mattis told the Senate, “We owe our Soldiers,
Airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen fixed treaty-based rights instead
of relying on the threat of force or customary international law.” Unfortunately, some Republican Senators have blocked an accession vote for years,
primarily on ideological grounds. But the incoming president campaigned
as an outsider who could break gridlock, depart from `business as usual,’
and put America back to work. He also spoke about seeking out `untapped
potential’ to increase America’s economic growth. Such potential could include the oil and mineral resources extractable from the seabed of world’s
oceans. Understandably, American companies are unwilling to assume the
risk of exploring seabed areas, given that foreign companies could piggyback at successful sites. Yet competitor nations who are parties to the convention, such as China, are lawfully taking advantage of exclusive seabed
licenses. If the United States joins the convention, then it too could leverage the freedom to tap into the economic potential of those maritime areas,
create American jobs extracting energy and other natural resources and
converting them into high-technology goods and expand the American
economy. As chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil, Tillerson told the Senate
248. Jonathan G. Odom, How Trump Can Make America Navigate Again, NATIONAL IN(Jan. 16, 2017), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-trump-can-make-america-navigate-again-19065.
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that accession to the convention is “important to our company—and arguably to America’s energy security.” 249

Four years later, the overarching U.S. national interests in national security, energy security and economic opportunity continue to exist; U.S. accession to UNCLOS would protect and promote those interests. Moreover,
U.S. accession would also improve U.S. credibility on its commitment to
protect and preserve the UNCLOS rules, which form a portion of the rulesbased element of the international order. If the United States acceded to the
treaty tomorrow, China would still likely ignore U.S. exhortations that it
complies with its legal obligations under the tribunal’s ruling. But a center of
gravity in this battle to preserve the existing rules-based international order
is the hearts and minds of other States, including, but not limited to, U.S.
allies and partners. Efforts to unite a chorus of voices in the international
community in support of the tribunal’s ruling and its significance to the international order would be greatly enhanced if the United States was a full
member of that community. Critics might argue that the United States is
already a full member due to its economic and military power; however, such
critics overlook the reality that the United States has no right to nominate
and elect U.S. judges to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
and has no voice at the annual meetings of State parties to UNCLOS—two
international forums that continue to shape and develop this important body
of international law.
In conclusion, the United States continuously invoked the tribunal’s ruling in the South China Sea arbitration in the four years since the ruling was
issued. This includes official words and actions under President Obama and
his administration in the first six months after the ruling and the words and
actions of the Trump administration in the subsequent four years. That administration candidly described how U.S. competition with China includes
deliberate efforts by the United States to preserve the existing international
rules-based order and uphold longstanding tenets of U.S. foreign policy in
the South China Sea. Additionally, the Trump administration amplified U.S.
challenges to China’s illegal maritime claims in the South China Sea through
public speeches, diplomatic statements, and operational assertions.
Taken together, these words and actions frequently invoked elements of
the tribunal’s ruling as reflecting international law binding upon the parties.
But as outlined above, there is more the United States can and should do to
249. Id.
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preserve the tribunal ruling’s value and ensure its viability. President Biden
and his administration should make those statements and take those actions
necessary to reinforce the importance of the ruling. Otherwise, there is a risk
that the decision rendered by the international tribunal on July 12, 2016, becomes merely another event dot, with limited significance on the chronological timeline of what we know as the South China Sea situation.
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